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Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid 
to Sub-Saharan Africa 
A CASE STUDY 
Allison D. Christians† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. is committed to increasing trade and 
investment to less developed countries (LDCs),1 particularly 
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 1 There is no uniform convention for the designation of a country as “less 
developed.”  The term is generally used to reflect a country’s economic status or growth 
potential.  In the context of taxation, these labels may be used to distinguish “in a 
general way between countries with highly developed, sophisticated tax systems and 
those whose tax systems are at an earlier stage of development.”  VICTOR THURONYI, 
TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING, at xxvii n.1 (1996).  In the United States, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) delineates three categories in a hierarchy, consisting of 34 
“developed countries,” 27 “former USSR/Eastern Europe,” and 172 “less developed 
countries” (all other recognized countries, including all of Sub-Saharan Africa except 
South Africa).  See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK 2005 (GPO 2005) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK]  (defining LDCs in 
Appendix B) (An internet version of the WORLD FACTBOOK is available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.  The internet version varies in format and 
content from the print version and is updated frequently; this article references the 
data found in the print version except where otherwise noted.)  As a rough guide to 
U.S. foreign policy, this article incorporates the CIA terms.  For a discussion of the 
arbitrary and often unyielding nature of these designations despite changes in a 
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those in Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty-related conditions 
are extreme and foreign trade and investment minimal.2  This 
commitment is demonstrated in U.S. efforts to negotiate 
agreements to eliminate trade barriers such as tariffs and 
quotas with many of these countries.3  U.S. officials also 
consistently proclaim a commitment to enter into tax treaties 
with LDCs,4 on the theory that tax treaties can eliminate 
  
particular country’s economic status or prospects, see What’s in a name?, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 17, 2004, at 11. 
 2 Since the late 1980s, increasing trade with and investment in LDCs has 
become a preferred means of providing aid to such countries.  See, e.g., PAUL B. 
THOMPSON, THE ETHICS OF AID AND TRADE 2 (1992); see also Bruce Zagaris, The 
Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks 
and No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 331, 384 (2003) (stating that the “official 
policies” of the U.S. “are to mobilize private capital rather than foreign aid.”).  For an 
overview of poverty conditions and foreign investment in African nations, see, for 
example, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Foreign Direct Investment in 
Africa: Performance and Potential 1-2, 21 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc. 15 (1999) 
[hereinafter UNCTAD] (stating that foreign investors typically associate Africa with 
“pictures of civil unrest, starvation, deadly diseases and economic disorder,” and 
foreign investment “inflows into Africa have increased only modestly” since the 1980s). 
 3 The main agreement is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a 
trade preference agreement, discussed infra note 18.  The U.S. is also currently 
negotiating a free trade agreement with the South African Customs Union (comprised 
of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland).  See United States 
Trade Representative, Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA (2003), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Southern_Africa_FTA/ 
Background_Information_on_the_US-SACU_FTA.html. 
 4 See, e.g., The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the Sri Lanka Tax 
Protocol (T. Doc. 108-9); Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 
29 (2004) (“[w]e are trying to expand the scope of these treaties to developing 
countries.”); Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues, 50 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 445, 450 (1996) (“[t]ax treaty expansion in this area is a high Treasury 
priority.”); Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Welcomes Entry into Force of 
U.S.-Sri Lanka Income Tax Treaty (July 22, 2004), available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/js1809.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Rel. JS-1809] (“The Treasury 
Department is committed to continuing to extend and broaden the U.S. tax treaty 
network, including new agreements with emerging economies.”).  The U.S. currently 
has 16 tax treaties with LDCs: Barbados, China, Cyprus, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela.  Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Barb., Dec. 31, 
1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,090 [hereinafter U.S.-Barbados Treaty]; Agreement for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, U.S.-P.R.C., Apr. 30, 1984 T.I.A.S. No. 12065 [hereinafter U.S.-China 
Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Cyprus, Mar. 19, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 4737 
[hereinafter U.S.-Cyprus Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Egypt, 
Aug. 24, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 1809 [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt Treaty]; Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, U.S.-India, Sept. 12, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-5 (1990) 
[hereinafter U.S.-India Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Indon., July 
11, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 11593 [hereinafter U.S.-Indonesia Treaty]; Convention for the 
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excessive taxation and therefore help to increase trade and 
investment between the partner countries.5  As such, tax 
treaties appear to be a perfect complement to trade agreements 
in furthering U.S. efforts to increase trade and investment in 
LDCs.  Yet there are currently no tax treaties in force between 
the U.S. and any of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa.6 
  
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Jam., May 21, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 2865 [hereinafter U.S.-Jamaica 
Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of International 
Trade and Investment, U.S.-S. Korea, June 4, 1976, 30 U.S.T. 5253 [hereinafter U.S.-
Korea Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Morocco, Aug. 1, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 
2545 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-
Pak., July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984; Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-
Phil., Oct. 1, 1976, 34 U.S.T. 1277 [hereinafter U.S.-Philippines Treaty]; Convention for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Sri Lanka, Mar. 14, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-10 (2004) 
[hereinafter, U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Thail., 
Nov. 26, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-2 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Thailand Treaty]; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Encouragement of International Trade and 
Investment, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, Jan. 9, 1970,  22 U.S.T. 164 [hereinafter U.S.- Trin. 
& Tobago Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Tunis., June 17, 
1985, as amended by Prot., 29 I.L.M. 1580 [hereinafter U.S.-Tunisia Treaty]; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Venez., Jan. 25, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 
1707 [hereinafter U.S.-Venezuela Treaty]. 
 5 This theory has been officially propounded since the first independent 
U.S.-LDC treaty was contemplated.  See Letter from John F. Dulles to the President 
(July 9, 1956), in STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 1445 (1962) (proclaiming 
that a treaty with Honduras would increase U.S. investment in that country because 
“[b]y eliminating double taxation . . . [tax treaties] have contributed much to the trade 
and investment flowing between [partner] countries and the United States”).  For a 
recent restatement of the theory, see The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the 
Sri Lanka Tax Protocol (T. Doc. 108-9): Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 108th Cong. 11 (2004) (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International Tax 
Council, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury) (in regards to a proposed treaty with Sri Lanka, “[t]he 
goal of the tax treaty is to increase the amount and efficiency of economic activity” 
between the partner countries). 
 6 The U.S. tax treaty network at one time included ten LDCs in Sub-
Saharan Africa, pursuant to extensions of existing tax treaties with the U.K. and 
Belgium.  Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Dep’t Announces Termination 
of Extensions of Income Tax Conventions Between the U.S. and the U.K. and the U.S. 
and Belgium to 18 Countries and Territories (July 1, 1983).  All of these treaties were 
subsequently terminated.  Id.  Today, the only Sub-Saharan African country with a 
U.S. tax treaty is South Africa.  Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
U.S.-S. Afr., Feb. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-9 (1997).  The United States 
considers South Africa to be a developed country.  See supra note 1.  Ethiopia, Ghana, 
and Liberia each have a treaty with the U.S. that deals solely with the taxation of 
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The lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs 
of Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be explained by disinterest or 
lack of support on the part of academics, practitioners, or 
lawmakers: representatives from all of these sectors have 
urged the importance of entering into these agreements.7  
Neither can the omission be attributed to disinterest on the 
part of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa themselves.8  Many of 
these nations have long pursued tax treaties with the U.S.,9 
and a few have gone so far as to formally and publicly express 
their interest in commencing negotiations with the U.S.10 
  
income from shipping and aircraft activity.  Agreement to Exempt from Income Tax, on 
a Reciprocal Basis, Income Derived from the International Operation of Aircraft and 
Ships, U.S.-Eth., Oct. 30-Nov. 12, 1998, STATE DEP’T. NO. 98-183; Agreement to 
Exempt from Income Tax, on a Reciprocal Basis, Certain Income Derived from the 
International Operation of a Ship or Ships and Aircraft, U.S.-Ghana, Nov. 12, 2001, 
STATE DEP’T. NO. 02-01; Agreement for Reciprocal Relief from Double Taxation on 
Earnings from Operation of Ships and Aircraft, U.S.-Liber., July 1-Aug. 11, 1982 34 
U.S.T. 1553.  However, these agreements are largely unnecessary due to parallel 
provisions in U.S. domestic tax law.  See I.R.C. § 883 (2005). 
 7 See, e.g., The U.S.-Africa Partnership: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Lugar) (supporting legislation 
that “directs the Secretary of the Treasury to seek negotiations regarding tax treaties 
with [AGOA] eligible countries”); Statement by Michael A. Samuels to the Subcomm. 
on Trade Comm. on Ways and Means (July 16, 1996), available at 1996 WL 433282 
(F.D.C.H.) (“Given the vital role that investment must play in the development of 
African countries . . . the new policy must contain several key investment-related 
priorities, including an emphasis on bilateral investment and tax treaties.”); Hon. 
Charles B. Rangel, The State of Africa: The Benefits of The African Growth and 
Opportunity Act—Next Steps (July 14, 2003), available at 149 CONG. REC. E1464-01 
(stating that the U.S. should negotiate tax treaties with AGOA countries); Calvin J. 
Allen, United States Should Expand Tax Treaty Network in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34 
TAX NOTES INT’L 57, 58 (2004) (same); Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. 
International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 45, 46, 69 (2002) (arguing for multilateral tax treaties between the 
U.S. and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa). 
 8 All of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are in urgent if not desperate need 
for foreign capital, and most are responding to the need by implementing measures to 
make their countries more attractive to foreign investors.  See, e.g., James Gathii, A 
Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade 
Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 179 (2003).  Given the powers ascribed to tax treaties in increasing trade and 
investment between partner countries, most LDCs would pursue the opportunity to 
commence negotiations with the U.S. (provided that the concessions required to secure 
such agreements are not too great). 
 9 For example, Nigeria began pursuing a tax treaty with the United States 
in 1978, after Nigeria unilaterally withdrew from its coverage under an extension of 
the 1945 tax treaty between the U.K. and the U.S. (as a former U.K. territory).  Nigeria 
to Terminate Tax Treaty with U.S., Seek Renegotiated One, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1978, 
at 23; see supra note 6 (discussing the treaty extension); I.R.S. Announcement 78-147, 
1978-41 I.R.B. 20 (Oct. 10, 1978) (terminating the treaty).  Although the tax treaty was 
apparently negotiated at length, it was never completed. 
 10 Calvin J. Allen, Botswana, Burundi Wish to Negotiate Tax Treaties with 
United States, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 1264 (2002).  This announcement is a rather 
unusual event, since tax treaties are generally commenced and negotiated in secret.  
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Finally, the lack of tax treaties cannot be charged to a 
lack of commitment on the part of the U.S. to conclude 
agreements that will increase trade and investment to assist in 
the economic growth of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.11  
The U.S. has demonstrated its commitment by making 
significant concessions in the context of trade and aid 
agreements, in the form of direct aid as well as reduced 
tariffs.12 
That the lack of tax treaties cannot be explained by a 
lack of support or commitment on the part of scholars, 
policymakers, or governments suggests that there must be 
some other reason or reasons that tax treaties have not been 
concluded between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  This article explores many of these reasons by 
presenting as a case study a hypothetical tax treaty between 
the U.S. and Ghana, one of the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.13  
Hypothesizing the structure and operation of a tax treaty 
between these two countries provides a vehicle for measuring 
the potential effect of such a treaty on international commerce.  
While there has been some discussion among scholars and 
policymakers regarding the paucity and inefficacy of tax 
treaties between the U.S. and LDCs, much of the discussion 
has focused on abstract principles of international tax law.  By 
examining the effects a U.S. treaty with Ghana might have on 
  
Their existence is usually made public after negotiations have concluded and the treaty 
has been signed by the respective countries, pending ratification.  RICHARD E. 
ANDERSEN & PETER H. BLESSING, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶ 
1.04[1][a][i], [ii] (2005).  Thus, countries don’t usually issue public proclamations 
regarding their desire to enter into tax treaties.  Similarly, since there is little public 
disclosure regarding progress in treaty-making by the U.S. Treasury Department, 
there is little means to determine the reaction, if any, that the Treasury has had to 
these or other requests to initiate negotiations.    
 11 See Richard Mitchell, United States-Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty 
Negotiations, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 225 (1997) (“[t]he United States 
displays eagerness to enter into tax treaties with developing nations”); Miranda 
Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse  of Tax Reform in Developing 
and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 148-49 (2003) (pointing to the 
number of U.S. treaties with other emerging economies as evidence that “the lack of 
U.S. treaty-making with [LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa] cannot be explained solely by a 
general reluctance to enter into tax treaties with less developed or non-capitalist 
countries.”).  
 12 The main agreements are the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), a preferential trade regime, discussed infra note 18, and the recently 
introduced Millennium Challenge Act, an aid package tied to countries’ demonstrated 
commitment to growth through investment and trade, discussed infra note 19. 
 13 Ghana was chosen as a subject for this case study for several reasons, 
including its existing commercial ties to the U.S.  These reasons are described infra 
Part III.A. 
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investors, this article analyzes these legal principles in the 
context of current global tax conditions for investment in LDCs.  
This case study demonstrates that in today’s global tax climate, 
a typical tax treaty would not provide significant tax benefits to 
current or potential investors.  Consequently, there is little 
incentive for these investors to pressure the U.S. government 
to conclude tax treaties with many LDCs.   
There are of course any number of other reasons why 
tax treaties may not be concluded between the U.S. and the 
LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, including competing priorities for 
the U.S. government, either for tax treaties with other 
countries or for other domestic or international tax matters.  
Undoubtedly, socio-political factors play an important role as 
well.14  However, this article argues that since tax treaties with 
LDCs like Ghana would not provide major tax benefits to the 
private sector, even if concluded, these treaties would not have 
a significant impact on cross-border investment and trade.  
Accordingly, the main justification so consistently proclaimed 
to support the pursuit of tax treaties between the U.S. and 
LDCs is misguided.  If the U.S. is truly committed to increasing 
investment and trade to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, an 
examination of how the global tax climate has changed since 
tax treaties were first implemented is in order.  We must 
acknowledge that tax treaties cannot deliver the promised 
benefits, and examine the factors that prevent them from so 
doing. 
An overview of the background and function of tax 
treaties and their proclaimed benefits is discussed in Part II of 
this article.  Part III presents the case study of a hypothetical 
tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana and shows that such a 
treaty would produce few tax benefits to current or potential 
investors and would therefore be largely ineffective in 
stimulating trade and investment between these two countries.  
Part IV concludes that after decades of adherence to the 
promise of tax treaties, we must acknowledge their failure to 
  
 14 For example, there may be national interests at stake, such as security, 
defense, or energy supply issues, that may contribute to the prioritization of concluding 
tax treaties with LDCs in other areas of the world, such as Sri Lanka (concluded in 
2004) and Bangladesh (currently pending ratification).  See John Venuti et al., Current 
Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and International Agreements, 34 TAX MGMT INT’L J. 653 
(2005) (updating on a monthly basis the status of current U.S. tax treaties and 
international agreements).  The various foreign policy goals that motivate the agenda 
for treaty-making is a subject that deserves much attention, but is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
2005] TAX TREATIES AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 645 
deliver, and search for alternative ways to achieve the goal of 
promoting aid through the vehicles of investment and trade. 
II. BACKGROUND: TAX TREATIES, INVESTMENT, AND TRADE 
This Part provides the context for a discussion of the 
role of tax treaties in delivering investment and aid to LDCs.  
Section A describes some of the strategies employed by the U.S. 
to assist LDCs, and how tax treaties comport with these 
strategies.  Section B explains the role tax treaties play as the 
locus of international tax law by outlining the purposes and 
goals surrounding the origin and evolution of these 
agreements.  Section C discusses the limitations that arise 
because international tax law concepts are embodied in a 
network of overlapping, varying, and mostly bilateral 
agreements between select nations.  This section introduces 
some of the problems faced by the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which operate largely outside of this network. 
A. U.S. Strategy for Assistance to LDCs 
The U.S. has adopted a foreign aid strategy towards 
Sub-Saharan Africa that centers on the idea that creating 
investment and trade opportunities for LDCs will most 
effectively boost economic growth in these countries, thereby 
lifting them out of poverty through commercial interaction with 
the global community.15  A key component of this foreign aid 
strategy is the identification and elimination of barriers to 
trade and investment.  Among the most significant potential 
barriers are double taxation, which occurs when two countries 
impose similar taxes on the same taxpayer in respect to the 
same item of income, regulatory barriers, such as currency 
exchange and other market controls, and tariffs.  These 
barriers have historically been addressed in very different 
ways.   
Regulatory barriers and tariffs have been addressed by 
most countries in a generally uniform manner through regional 
and global trade agreements.16  The main multilateral 
agreement is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), to which 147 countries are signatories through the 
  
 15 See supra note 2. 
 16 Regulatory barriers are also addressed, to a lesser extent, in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), as discussed infra Part IV.E. 
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World Trade Organization (WTO).17  Additional tariff and 
regulatory barrier reduction between the U.S. and Sub-
Saharan Africa has been accomplished through the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an agreement that seeks 
to increase growth and alleviate poverty through the 
elimination of tariffs and quotas for selected imports from 
designated Sub-Saharan African nations.18  Another barrier 
reduction device is the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 
(MCA), a new official direct assistance initiative that will direct 
foreign aid only to countries demonstrating a commitment to 
poverty reduction through economic growth.19 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD),20 the harmful effects of double 
  
 17 Thirty-seven of the forty-seven LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are members 
of the WTO.  See the GATT agreement and accompanying agreements, available at 
Understanding the World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
 18 The Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 
251. (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3721 (2000)) (more commonly known as the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA I)), amended by Trade Act of 2002 Pub. L. 
No. 107-210 §3108, 116 Stat. 933, 1038-1040 (AGOA II), amended by AGOA 
Acceleration Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-274, 118 Stat. 820 (AGOA III) [hereinafter 
referring to the three acts collectively as AGOA].  AGOA eliminates “competitive need 
limitations” (quotas) and tariffs on over 1,800 items that would otherwise be subject to 
such constraints under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (unless 
otherwise exempt under a free trade agreement).  See AGOA § 103(2) (2004);  see also 
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 67-68 
(2004), available at http://www.usitc.gov; AGOA Faq, http://www.agoa.gov/faq/faq.html 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005).  AGOA is a preferential trade regime, rather than a free 
trade agreement.  For a discussion of AGOA and other trade and aid initiatives entered 
into with Sub-Saharan Africa over the past several years up to 2002, see Brown, supra 
note 7, at 49-51.  As of March, 2005, 36 of the 47 LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
eligible for AGOA benefits.  For a list of currently-eligible countries, see the AGOA, 
Country Eligibility, http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2005). 
 19 Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 211-
226; see S. Res. 571, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).  For information on the MCA, see 
the MCA website, http://www.mca.gov; see also Colin Powell, Welcome Message from 
the Honorable Colin L. Powell, http://www.mca.gov (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (stating 
that the MCA “reflects a new international consensus that development aid produces 
the best results when it goes to countries that adopt pro-growth strategies for meeting 
political, social and economic challenges”).  The MCA is not solely directed at Sub-
Saharan Africa, but approximately half of its currently identified recipient countries 
are located in this region.  See Millennium Challenge Corporation: Eligible Countries, 
available at http://www.mca.gov/countries/eligible/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 
2005). 
 20 The OECD is an international organization consisting of thirty member 
countries, all of which are considered by the United States to be developed countries 
with the nominal exception of South Korea, which the United States specifically 
classifies as less developed even though all OECD countries are deemed to be 
developed under the “developed country” listing.  WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 
628, 639, 641.  It is perhaps worthy of note that other organizations, such as the IMF, 
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taxation on cross-border trade and investment “are so well 
known that it is scarcely necessary to stress the importance of 
removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to the 
development of economic relations between countries.”21  The 
U.S. government mirrors this sentiment, identifying the 
eradication of “tax barriers” as a major component of its 
dedication “to eliminating unnecessary barriers to cross-border 
trade and investment.”22 
Yet, unlike other barriers to trade and investment, 
double taxation has not been reconciled on a global scale.  
Instead of a world tax organization to coordinate efforts and 
resolve disputes,23 relieving double taxation remains the 
  
diverge from the views of the United States in some of these classifications.  For 
instance, the IMF classification of “developing countries,” while similar in most 
respects to the United States’ classification of LDCs, diverges by including in its list 
both Mexico and Turkey.  Id. at 628.  Mexico is not independently listed as a developed 
country under the United States’ classification system, and the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovakia are separately categorized as “former USSR/Eastern European” 
countries, but the term developed countries is defined as including all of the OECD 
member countries.  See OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD and OECD 
Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402 
_1_1_1_1,00.html; WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 628, 639, 641 (Appendix B 
provides a listing of LDCs that includes the “Four Dragons,” a group that includes 
South Korea.  Country data on South Korea provides GDP and poverty statistics, 
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html).  The CIA still 
considers South Korea an LDC despite its 2004 estimated per capita GDP of $19,200, 
well over the typical $10,000 threshold separating developed from less-developed, and 
despite the fact that just 4% of the population is considered to be living in poverty 
conditions.  WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 304, 628, 639.  In contrast, the 
inclusion of Mexico as a developed country is anomalous, given its per capita GDP of 
$9,600.  Id. at 365, 628.  As discussed below, the OECD developed and continually 
updates a model income tax convention that both encapsulates and sets international 
tax standards. 
 21 OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME 
AND ON CAPITAL 7 (2005) [hereinafter OECD MODEL]. 
 22 Treasury Press Release JS-1809, supra note 4 (“This new tax treaty 
relationship will serve to eliminate tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment 
between the two countries . . . [by providing] greater certainty to taxpayers with 
respect to the tax treatment of their cross-border activities and [reducing] the potential 
for double taxation of income from such activities.”); Press Release, U.S. Treasury 
Dep’t, Remarks by Treasury Secretary John W. Snow at the Signing Ceremony for the 
U.S.-Barbados Income Tax Protocol (July 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1786.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Rel. JS-
1786]; see also Treasury Press Release JS-1267, Treasury Welcomes Senate Approval of 
New U.S.-Sri Lanka Tax Treaty (March 26, 2004), available at http://www. 
treas.gov/press/releases/js1267.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Rel. JS-1267] (stating 
that the new treaty with Sri Lanka is “an important step in our ongoing efforts to 
broaden the reach of our tax treaty network”). 
 23 See What is the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
whatis_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (noting that the WTO is “the only international 
organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations”).  The several 
international organizations concerned with standardizing and coordinating global 
taxation do not approach the level of member country participation in the WTO.  For 
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purview of individual countries.24  Nevertheless, a consensus 
has emerged regarding the appropriate tax treatment of cross-
border investment activity.25  Under this consensus, double 
taxation is addressed primarily by tax treaties, which allocate 
tax revenue among jurisdictions based on concepts of residence 
and source.26    
Thus, the U.S., along with the rest of the developed 
world, has a network of tax treaties, spanning most of its major 
trading partners across the globe.27  Expanding the tax treaty 
network has been termed by the Treasury Department as a 
commitment, an ongoing effort,28 and the “primary means” for 
the elimination of tax barriers to international trade and 
  
example, the OECD is one of the primary international organizations that concerns 
itself with setting standards for international taxation, but it has only 30 members, few 
new members are added (the latest addition was the Slovak Republic, in 2000), and 
many countries with rapidly growing economies, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China, are not members.  OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD and 
OECD Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_ 
1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2006). 
 24 The vast majority of international agreements that address the problem of 
double taxation are bilateral.  See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Tax as 
International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 497 (2004) (noting that there are over 2,000 
bilateral tax treaties).  However, there are a few regional multilateral tax treaties 
currently in force, including the Andean Pact Income Tax Convention between Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (Nov. 16, 1971); the Arab Economic Unity 
Council Tax Treaty between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen 
(Y.A.R.) (Dec. 3, 1973); the Agreement Among the Governments of the Member States 
of the Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits, or Gains and Capital Gains 
and for the Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment between the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) countries of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago (July 6, 1994); the Tax Convention Between the 
Member States of the West African Economic Community (C.E.A.O.) between Burkina 
Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal (Oct. 29, 1984); the 
Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Personal Income and Property, 
signed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany (G.D.R.), Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, and the Soviet Union (still in force with respect to various successor states) 
(May 27, 1977); and the Convention Between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, between Denmark, 
the Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (Sept. 23, 1996) (generally 
based on the OECD Model). 
 25 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International 
Taxation: A Proposal For Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996) (providing an 
introduction to the evolution of international taxation from decisions and compromises 
made by the U.S. and the League of Nations in the 1920s to the “flawed miracle” that 
exists today). 
 26 See id. at 1306. 
 27 See discussion infra accompanying notes 96 and 97. 
 28 Treasury Press Release JS-1267, supra note 22. 
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investment.29  Officials from other countries echo these 
sentiments.30   
From the perspective of LDCs, a major problem with 
embodying international tax laws aimed at preventing double 
taxation in tax treaties is that LDCs typically have few of these 
treaties in place.  But the tax treaty network, with its central 
role in the evolution of international tax law, directly affects 
these countries regardless of their level of inclusion.  To 
demonstrate the extent of this influence, the following Section 
discusses why and how tax treaties became the source of 
international tax law, and explores how this international tax 
system has impacted tax treaties between the U.S. and the 
LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.   
B. Origins of Tax Treaties as International Law 
Every country establishes its jurisdiction to impose 
income taxation under sovereign claim of right.  In the U.S., 
the taxation of income from international transactions turns on 
whether the income is earned by a resident31 or a nonresident.32  
In the case of residents, the U.S. purports to tax “all income 
from whatever source derived.”33  In the case of nonresidents, 
the U.S. taxing jurisdiction is generally limited to income 
derived from investments and business activities carried out in 
  
 29 Treasury Press Release JS-1809, supra note 4; Treasury Press Release JS-
1786, supra note 22; see also Letter from Gregory F. Jenner thanking Sen. Susan M. 
Collins for her Comments on a Possible Chile-U.S. Tax Treaty, U.S. Treasury Thanks 
Senator for Comments on Possible Chile-U.S. Tax Treaty (Apr. 22, 2004), 2004 WTD 83-
16 (“Income tax treaties can serve the important purpose of addressing tax-related 
barriers to cross-border trade and investment.”). 
 30 For example, Bangladeshi officials assert that when the new treaty 
between the U.S. and Bangladesh enters into force, it “will encourage U.S. investment 
in the education, highway, and communication sectors in Bangladesh.”  U.S. Treaty 
Update, PwC In & Out, 15 J. INT’L TAX’N 4-5 (Dec. 2004). 
 31 Whether individual or entity.  See I.R.C. § 7701(a), (b) (2005). 
 32 Id. 
 33 I.R.C. § 61(a) (2005) (“gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived”); see also I.R.C. §§ 1, 11(a) (2005) (imposing tax on incomes of individuals and 
corporations, respectively); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1-1(b), 1.11-1(a).  The authority to extend 
its jurisdiction in this broad fashion is confirmed by Cook v. Tait.  265 U.S. 47, 56 
(1924):  
The basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon 
the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, 
nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, 
that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to 
the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen. 
Id. 
650 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
the U.S. (known as source-based taxation).34  Most developed 
countries similarly impose worldwide, or residence-based, 
income taxation on residents, and source-based taxation on 
income earned within their borders.35  As a result, ample 
potential exists for double taxation of international 
transactions involving two developed countries.36  Therefore, 
the U.S. and most of the other countries that impose worldwide 
taxation provide a foreign tax credit,37 which essentially 
removes the residence-based layer of tax while preserving the 
source-based layer.  Thus, the U.S. and most other countries 
imposing worldwide income taxation generally relieve double 
taxation on a unilateral basis under statutory law.  
The same result is attained under treaties.  Tax treaties 
are contracts, generally between two countries,38 under which 
the signatory countries agree to the taxation each will impose 
on the activities carried out between their respective 
jurisdictions.39  Because the U.S. unilaterally provides a 
  
 34 I.R.C. §§ 871, 881-82 (2005). 
 35 OECD countries generally impose some form of worldwide taxation, 
although a few (Australia, Austria, and Switzerland) provide certain statutory 
exemptions, and many provide for exemption under treaty, as discussed below.  See 
Ernst & Young, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 29-53, 894-910 (2005), available at 
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Ireland/WorldWideCorporateTaxGuide/$file/ 
WW_Corporate_Tax_guide_2005_.pdf (describing the tax systems of, and treaty 
benefits provided by Australia, Austria, and Switzerland, respectively). Some countries 
such as France are generally source-based, or territorial systems, which generally 
refrain from taxing the foreign income earned by their residents.  See id. at 240-52.  
However, these countries enforce worldwide taxation of certain kinds of income earned 
in low-tax jurisdictions in order to prevent capital flight.  Id.  Thus, France imposes 
worldwide taxation on certain low-taxed foreign income.  See generally id. (providing 
tax system features and rates). 
 36 The most common form of double taxation occurs when there is a 
residence-source overlap, as a taxpayer’s country of residence (the home country) 
imposes residence-based tax on income earned in a foreign (source, or host) country, 
while the host country imposes source-based tax on the same item.  Overlaps can also 
occur when countries have overlapping or conflicting rules for determining the source 
of an item of income or the residence of a taxpayer.  For example, while the United 
States assigns corporate residence according to country of incorporation, the U.K. 
assigns corporate residence according to the seat of management and control.  See 
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5) (2005) (assigning corporate residence to country of 
incorporation).   
 37 See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 35. 
 38 But see supra note 24 (noting that some treaties are multilateral).  
 39 In the U.S., treaties have the same effect as acts of Congress, and are 
equivalent to any other U.S. law.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Samann v. Comm’r, 313 
F.2d 461, 463 (4th Cir. 1963); American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 
1957).  As such, they are subject to and may be overridden by subsequent revisions in 
domestic law (“treaty override”) under the “last in time” rule of I.R.C. § 7852(d) (2005).  
See Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871) (“a treaty may supersede a 
prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”); Edye v. 
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-600 (1884) (“A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act 
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mechanism to prevent U.S. taxation in the event foreign 
taxation applies, treaties aimed at relieving double taxation 
would appear to be duplicative.40  Treaties might seem 
unnecessary ab initio, since the U.S. provided the foreign tax 
credit mechanism almost immediately following the inception 
of the income tax itself, decades before any tax treaties were 
ever negotiated.41  Nevertheless, the U.S. began entering into 
tax treaties in 1932 and the practice continues to the present.42   
One of the original reasons to enter into treaties was 
that before they existed, there was no international standard 
for relieving double taxation: the U.S. was alone in providing a 
comprehensive foreign tax credit that unilaterally relieved 
  
of Congress is . . . [so a] court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case 
before it as it would to a statute.”); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“a 
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation . . . .  If the two are 
inconsistent, the last one in date will control the other”); see also Philip F. Postlewaite 
& David S. Makarski, The ALI Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and a Modest Proposal, 
52 TAX LAW. 731, 740 (1999) (arguing that treaty override is seen as a “serious 
problem” because it potentially places the U.S. in violation of existing international 
obligations); Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 131 (1995) (discussing treaty override in the U.S. and 
concluding that “these provisions embody an important contractual principle”: that 
breach of an obligation is desirable when “what is gained from the party that breaches 
exceeds what is lost by the party against whom the breach occurred,” thus a breach 
might be appropriate as long as the United States compensates the aggrieved party). 
 40 See generally Elisabeth Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their 
Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428 (1963) (arguing that 
treaties play a relatively small role in relieving double taxation, owing to the U.S. 
foreign tax credit); see also Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 939 (2000) (showing that tax treaties are not needed to relieve double taxation, 
since each country would find it in its own best interest to unilaterally relieve double 
taxation on its citizens and residents). 
 41 After a brief and limited stint during the Civil War, the income tax was re-
introduced in 1913.  See STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 5, 278 (2002).  The 
foreign tax credit was enacted quickly thereafter, in 1918.  See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 
18, §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 240(c), Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080-82 (1919).  
Section 222(a)(1) was applicable to individuals, 238(a) to corporations, and 240(c) 
defined the taxes for which credit would be allowed. 
 42 The first U.S. tax treaty was signed with France in 1932 and entered into 
force on April 9, 1935.  Convention on Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 27, 1932 S. 
EXEC. DOC. K, 72-1 (1935).  Since then, the U.S. tax treaty network has grown by an 
average of one treaty per year, based on the entry-in-force dates of all U.S. tax treaties 
ever entered into force.  The most recent treaty to enter into force is with Sri Lanka.  
See U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4 (entered into force June 13, 2004).  The most 
recently signed is with Bangladesh, which was signed on September 26, 2004, but as of 
the time of publication has not yet entered into force.  See Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to 
Taxes On Income, U.S.-Bangl., Sept. 26, 2004, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-5; see also 
Muhammad Kibria, Bangladesh, United States Sign Tax Treaty, 2004 WTD 188-3 
(Sept. 28, 2004). 
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residence-based taxation.43  The provision of unilateral relief of 
double taxation was seen as a “present of revenue to other 
countries,” for which the possibility of source-based taxation 
was preserved.44  Other European nations, especially Italy and 
France, relied heavily on source-based taxation and therefore 
vigorously defended the U.S. position of ceding residence-based 
taxation to that of source.45  In stark contrast, Britain imposed 
worldwide taxation and provided a foreign tax credit that was 
extremely limited and generally preserved its residence-based 
taxation.46   
The conflicting views of the U.S. and the U.K. regarding 
the proper method for relieving double taxation prompted 
several years of debate out of which a consensus emerged in 
the early 1920s.47  Under this consensus, “personal taxation” 
was to be preserved for residence-based taxation, and 
“impersonal taxation” was to be preserved for source.48  How 
these terms would be defined and implemented in the context 
of the then vastly differing tax systems depended on long and 
  
 43 See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021, 1023 (1996); H. David Rosenbloom & 
Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 359 (1981). 
 44 EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL 
COOPERATION, 132, 135 (1928). Source-based taxation was even enhanced to the extent 
the foreign country’s tax rates were lower than that of the U.S.  In such cases, foreign 
countries could raise their tax rates to the U.S. level with the assurance that these 
taxes would be creditable in the U.S., leaving the investor indifferent as to the higher 
foreign rate.  See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 190 (1996) (“Neutrality depends on who pays what tax, not which 
government collects it.”). 
 45 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1072. 
 46 Britain’s view was supported by the Netherlands.  See Ernst & Young, 
supra note 35, at 631-32.  Both countries were primarily capital-exporting nations, and 
thus the importance of preserving residence-based taxation was high.  The U.S. was 
also a capital-exporting nation at the time, but arguably regarded source-based 
taxation as having the superior claim.  Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1046. 
 47 Discussions began in the newly formed International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) in 1920.  In 1921 the ICC adopted a resolution that taxing jurisdiction 
turned on the nature of the tax, with distinctions being made between “super” and 
“normal” taxes.  However, the U.S. rejected this resolution and endorsed closer 
adherence to the U.S. system, with exceptions made for particular kinds of income, 
including that from international shipping (as to which residence-based taxation was to 
be preserved) and that from sales of manufactured goods (to be apportioned under 
formula).  The ICC synthesized the views of the U.S. and fourteen other countries and 
produced a new resolution in Rome, in 1923.  The League of Nations began to take over 
the discussions in 1923, using the Rome resolutions as a basis for discussion.  The 
compromise of the ICC as to “super” and “normal” taxes resurfaced in League of 
Nations discussions.  See id., at 1067-70; Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: 
Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad, 2 INT’L LAW. 692, 696 (1968). 
 48 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1080.   
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contentious negotiations, held under the auspices of the League 
of Nations, in which the U.S. played a large part.49   
Ultimately, the League of Nations promulgated a model 
tax treaty under which countries would reciprocally restrict 
source-based taxation of passive income items, such as 
dividends and interest, in favor of preserving residence 
jurisdiction over these items,50 and reciprocally relieve 
residence-based taxation on foreign-source business income, as 
had been done unilaterally by the U.S. through the foreign tax 
credit.51  By subsequently entering into tax treaties following 
the League of Nations model, the U.S. retreated from its 
position of unilaterally providing foreign tax credits.  The tax 
concessions thereby obtained from treaty partners reduced the 
revenue cost of the foreign tax credit, which had been the main 
goal of U.S. involvement in first negotiating these 
instruments.52  
The concepts embodied in the League of Nations model 
treaty evolved into a model treaty developed by the OECD in 
1963, which has been updated periodically since then (the 
OECD Model).53  The OECD Model has become the standard 
upon which most of the over 2,000 tax treaties currently in 
force are based.54  Following the League of Nations and OECD 
standards, tax treaties minimize source-based taxation of 
income derived from passive investment activity, such as 
  
 49 See Carroll, supra note 47, at 693, 698 (stating that in the early 1920s the 
U.S. had been invited by the League of Nations to participate in forming tax treaty 
policy, but the Department of State had not responded because of the Senate’s rejection 
of membership in the League (by virtue of its failure to consent to ratification of the 
Treaty of Versailles).  Nevertheless, interest in tax treaties grew in the U.S. and the 
League planned subsequent Committee meetings to “facilitate attendance by 
Americans.”). 
 50 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1086-87 (citing Britain’s strong role in 
producing this result); Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1306. 
 51 See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1023.  The League of Nations first 
produced a model treaty in 1927.  See Carroll, supra note 47, at 698. 
 52 See Carroll, supra note 47, at 693-94 (interest in pursuing tax treaties 
grew because these instruments “would reduce the amount of foreign taxes that could 
be credited against the United States tax . . . and possibly leave something for the 
Treasury to collect.”). 
 53 The OECD Model was itself based on a series of model treaties 
promulgated by the League of Nations.  It has since been updated several times to cope 
with the changing nature of business, culminating with the most recent update on 
February 1, 2005.  Unless otherwise noted, references in this article to the OECD 
Model refer to the 2005 version, which is available at http://www.oecd.org.  See OECD 
MODEL, supra note 21. 
 54 Compiled in February 2005 from Ernst & Young, supra note 35, and the 
LexisNexis Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, 
http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?250064 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
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dividends, interest and royalties, while preserving residence-
based taxation of these items.  Once activities increase to a 
sufficiently significant level of engagement, however, source-
based jurisdiction again takes precedence.55   
As a member of the OECD, the U.S. participated in the 
development of the OECD model, but also developed its own 
model to reflect specific policies (the U.S. Model).56  First 
published in 1977 and most recently updated in 1996, the U.S. 
Model is based on the OECD Model in most respects.57  One 
notable difference between the models, however, is that the 
OECD Model allows for the alleviation of double taxation either 
via a foreign tax credit or by providing that the residence 
country will exempt the income earned in the source country 
(known as the exemption method).58  The U.S. Model, in 
keeping with its historical preference to impose worldwide 
taxation and alleviate double taxation via the foreign tax credit 
mechanism, allows only the credit method.59  All modern U.S. 
tax treaties are based on the U.S. Model, with modifications 
made to reflect changes in law or policy since the release of the 
latest model.60  The consensus forged through the original 
  
 55 The required level of engagement is defined as a “permanent 
establishment” as discussed infra Part II.C.2.   
 56 See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, available at  
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/model996.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL]; 
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996: TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstrty/usmtech.pdf. 
 57 The Joint Committee on Taxation compares provisions of both the U.S. and 
OECD models when analyzing and describing new tax treaties entered into by the U.S.  
See, e.g., George Yin, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, Testimony of the Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 
Hearing on the Proposed Tax Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka (Feb. 25, 2004) 
(explaining the use of the U.S. and OECD models in treaty negotiations and describing 
ways in which the new Japan-U.S. Treaty deviates from each model), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-13-04.pdf. 
 58 OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 23A (exemption method), 23B (credit 
method).  For example, among OECD countries, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, and Poland have treaties in which they completely relinquish their residual 
taxation of income derived by a permanent establishment.  See generally Ernst & 
Young, supra note 35.  For a recent example, see the Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital, Belg.-Ecuador, Dec. 18, 1996, 2248 U.N.T.S. 676 (entered into force 
Mar. 18, 2004). 
 59 See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 23. 
 60 A revised U.S. Model is apparently forthcoming from the Treasury 
Department.  It was originally scheduled for release in December 2004.  See Kevin A. 
Bell, New Model Treaty Won’t Provide for Zero Dividend Withholding, 2005 TNT 70-7 
(Apr. 13, 2005); Lee A. Sheppard, Angus Talks Treaty Policy, 2004 TNT 232-3 (Dec. 2, 
2004) (stating that Treasury will issue an updated model treaty to reflect clauses in 
recently negotiated treaties). 
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model treaties has remained constant: in general, residence-
based, or worldwide taxation is accorded primary status in the 
case of dueling tax jurisdictions, with treaties serving to set the 
limited boundaries within which source-based taxation will 
continue to take precedence. 
Residence-based, or worldwide income taxation is 
typically justified on the grounds that it promotes capital 
export neutrality, an efficiency principle dictating that 
taxpayers will not differentiate on tax grounds between 
locating activities domestically or abroad on tax grounds, since 
in either case the income generally will be subject to tax at the 
same rate.61  Thus, if taxation is imposed by a source country, 
the U.S. as home country generally provides the foreign tax 
credit against the U.S. tax imposed on the same item of income, 
leaving the U.S. investor in the same tax position as if the 
investment had been subject only to domestic tax.62   
However, most countries, including the U.S., do not 
completely adhere to principles of capital export neutrality, 
regardless of the existence of tax treaties.  Because the U.S. 
generally does not tax the foreign income of foreign companies, 
it is a relatively simple matter to avoid U.S. tax on much 
foreign income by placing the income stream in a foreign 
  
 61 See generally PEGGY MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS (1969).  The concept of capital export 
neutrality and its converse, capital import neutrality, were first developed by Peggy 
Musgrave in 1969 and they have been vigorously analyzed and debated ever since.  For 
an overview of these norms, and an argument that capital export neutrality is 
generally the best principle for international taxation of both portfolio and direct 
investment, see Avi-Yonah, infra note 164, at 1604.  See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 108TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS TAX ISSUES PREPARED 
FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TAX POLICY DISCUSSION SERIES 53-
54 (JCX-23-02) (Comm. Print 2002) (arguing that a worldwide tax system promotes 
economic efficiency, because investment location decisions will be governed by business 
considerations rather than tax considerations, and equity, because domestic and 
multinational activities are treated alike, and suggesting that worldwide taxation in 
some form is requisite to preserve the tax base from erosion by flight of activities to tax 
havens); CAVES, supra note 44, at 190 (stating that all relevant taxes taken together 
are neutral if domestic and overseas investments that earn the same pre-tax return 
also yield the same after-tax return).   
 62 If tax credits perfectly offset foreign taxes paid, the taxpayer is indifferent 
to the allocation of the tax.  See CAVES, supra note 44, at 190.  Most foreign tax credit 
systems are not perfectly offsetting but impose limitations as to creditability of taxes 
based on type or source of income and amount paid relative to domestic tax otherwise 
imposed.  In the U.S., foreign taxes are currently segregated among several baskets 
according to the type of income that gave rise to the tax for purposes of applying a limit 
on the allowable tax credit.  I.R.C. §§ 901-904 (2005).  As a result, pooling of income 
from low-tax countries may be advantageous to taxpayers who have paid foreign taxes 
in excess of the allowable tax credit.  See, e.g., David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 477 (1996). 
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entity.63  In so doing, U.S. persons may defer U.S. taxation 
until the foreign earnings are repatriated in the form of 
dividends or capital gains.64  
Deferral of this kind is the equivalent of a statutorily 
optional exemption of foreign income from U.S. taxation, as 
U.S. tax can be suspended indefinitely, according to the needs 
and desires of the shareholders.65  Thus, deferral allows 
taxpayers to convert U.S. residence-based taxation to source-
based taxation when it suits their purposes.66  To protect 
revenues, the U.S. has responded with a series of anti-deferral 
rules to prevent the easy escape of capital to foreign 
jurisdictions.67  To date, these anti-deferral measures have 
  
 63 See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public 
Choice Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 113 (1988) (discussing the 
ease of avoiding U.S. tax through foreign entities); Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 1324-
25 (arguing that as a result of the distinction between foreign and domestic companies 
in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) and (5) (2005) and the ensuing difference in taxation under I.R.C. 
§§ 11(d), 881, and 882 (2005), “taxpayers can easily choose between classification as 
foreign or domestic according to the formal jurisdiction of their incorporation”). 
 64 Deferral is limited to some extent, as discussed infra Part III.B.  However, 
a U.S. person that earns active foreign income through a foreign corporation is 
generally not subject to U.S. tax until profits are repatriated as a dividend or the stock 
is sold, under the rules of Subpart F, I.R.C. §§ 951-964.   
 65 To allow deferral is therefore to provide incentives for active business 
operations to be located outside of the U.S., in low-tax jurisdictions.  See Robert J. 
Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International 
Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 987 (1997) (arguing that deferral 
“undercuts the fairness and efficiency of the U.S. tax system” by allowing profits 
earned overseas in low-tax jurisdictions to escape tax while equivalent domestic 
activities would be subject to tax).  As a tax expenditure that costs the U.S. 
approximately $7.5 billion per year, deferral may be viewed as a subsidy, or tax 
incentive, for foreign business activities.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 287, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
budget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf.  Capital gains may be avoidable in the context of a 
conversion or liquidation of a subsidiary.  See Dover Corp. v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 324, 
338, 353 (2004) (allowing the conversion of a foreign corporate subsidiary to 
disregarded entity status to avoid creation of subpart F income on its subsequent sale).  
However, the IRS disagrees with this conclusion.  See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 199937038 (Sept. 17, 1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/9937038.pdf (holding that proceeds from sale of subsidiary after change in 
classification to disregarded entity did not escape subpart F); I.R.S. Chief Couns. Field 
Serv. Adv. Mem. 200049002 (Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/0049002.pdf; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200046008 (Aug. 4, 2000), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0046008.pdf (same, with sale made to 
related party).  
 66 See Peroni, supra note 65, at 987. 
 67 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 363 (1986) (“[I]t is generally appropriate to 
impose current U.S. tax on easily movable income earned through a controlled foreign 
corporations since there is likely to be limited economic reason for the U.S. person’s use 
of the foreign corporation . . . .”).  In practice, current taxation applies to a significantly 
lesser extent than is contemplated under the subpart F rules, as these rules are 
apparently “not fully effective in meeting their objectives.”  Harry Grubert, Tax 
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largely been restricted to passive income items so that deferral 
is still available for active income (residual taxation of which 
the U.S. might forego, under the foreign tax credit, if foreign 
taxes are in fact imposed). 
Despite the significance of deferral in curtailing the 
imposition of worldwide income taxation, the concept of 
residence-based taxation is the default system of most 
developed countries.  The protection of residence-based 
taxation, by scaling back the need for foreign tax credits, was 
(and is) given as a reason—perhaps the primary reason—for 
entering into tax treaties.  The OECD Model, as the baseline 
for the majority of the world’s tax treaties, thus represents an 
international consensus that the appropriate jurisdiction to tax 
income arising from cross-border activity is primarily the 
residence jurisdiction.68  This consensus, however, has not 
eliminated the limitations inherent in using tax treaties as the 
primary mechanism for the international coordination of tax 
matters. 
C. Limitations on the Use of Treaties as International Tax 
Law 
Treaties are the traditional mechanism used for 
relieving double taxation on cross-border activity.  However, 
they have several significant limitations which render them an 
inefficient and unsatisfactory means of achieving their goals.  
This Section discusses some of these limitations, including the 
incomplete coverage and restricted scope of tax treaties, their 
lack of uniformity, and their reliance on the assumption of 
reciprocal capital flows, and therefore reciprocal tax regimes, 
among contracting states. 
  
Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Governments: Is There Evidence of 
Changes in Behavior?, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION & MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 113, 
137 (James R. Hines, Jr., ed. 2001) (less than 50% of after-tax income of subsidiaries 
located in three Caribbean tax havens was subject to current tax under subpart F); see 
also Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on 
Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 464 (1999) (“[A]nti-deferral provisions can 
be readily circumvented . . . .”).  For a discussion of the deferral privilege and its 
inconsistency with U.S. international tax principles including the norm of capital 
export neutrality, see Peroni, supra note 65. 
 68 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 1303 (stating that a “coherent 
international tax regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support”); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 509 (1999) 
(arguing that the worldwide network of tax treaties constitutes an international tax 
regime with definable, common principles). 
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1. Limited Coverage, Scope, and Uniformity 
Not all countries have tax treaties, and no country has 
tax treaties with all the other countries of the world.  The 
average individual tax treaty network comprises just 17 treaty 
partners, and over half of all countries have tax treaty 
networks of five or fewer treaty partners.69  In addition, the 
benefits of treaties are typically limited to activities conducted 
between the two signatory countries.70  As a result, there would 
have to be over 32,000 bilateral tax treaties to cover every 
possible cross-border transaction.71  The U.S. would have to 
enter into new treaties with over 160 countries to ensure that 
its coverage spanned the globe.72  At its current average rate of 
expansion of one new treaty per year since its first treaty was 
concluded with France in 1935, the prospect of completing a 
universal U.S. tax treaty network in a timely fashion appears 
slight.73  
In addition, the OECD Model is aimed at only income 
taxation, to the exclusion of other kinds of taxes.74  Thus the 
  
 69 About 30% of countries have no tax treaties in force.  For the 35 countries 
considered by the U.S. to be developed, the average network is about 49 treaties; for 
OECD countries, the average is 60.  For less developed countries, the average is 8.  
Compiled in February 2005 from Ernst & Young, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 
(2004) and the LexisNexis Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, supra note 
55. 
 70 This is almost universally true when the U.S. is a party.  See U.S. MODEL, 
supra note 56, art. 22, at 31-33. 
 71 This figure is based on the assumption that there are approximately 255 
independent nations in the world today—a figure that is an estimate because 
sovereignty of nations is a matter of foreign policy that varies from nation to nation.  A 
currently prominent example is the case of Taiwan.  See, e.g., Chen Redux: Inside the 
Rhetoric, There are Hints of a Thaw All Round, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, at 37 
(discussing China’s tight grip and world response).  See also WORLD FACTBOOK, supra 
note 1, at 610-13 (country data on Taiwan), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/tw.html. 
 72 The United States currently has 56 comprehensive income tax treaties in 
force which cover 64 countries.  See John Venuti et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax 
Treaties and International Agreements, supra note 14 (listing all countries covered by 
tax treaties).  The United States formally recognizes a total of 233 nations.  See World 
Factbook at 628, 630, and 639 (acknowledging the existence of 34 developed countries, 
27 former USSR/Eastern European countries, and 172 less developed countries). 
 73 Compiled by averaging the first entry-in-force dates of all comprehensive 
U.S. income tax treaties ever in force (on file with author). 
 74 For reasons owing to historical distinctions that may be less clear today, 
income taxes have generally been attended to in tax treaties, while trade taxes are 
addressed in trade agreements. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Joel Slemrod, 
Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1683 (2001); Paul R. 
McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1621 (2001); Alvin C. Warren, 
Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131 
(2001). 
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term “double taxation” refers more particularly to double 
income taxation, and the term “relief of double taxation” refers 
particularly to the alleviation of circumstances in which two 
countries assert income taxation on the same item of income.75  
Yet, there are a number of other taxes applied on businesses 
and individuals.  Increasingly prominent throughout the world 
are consumption and trade taxes, and, primarily in developed 
countries, social security and other payroll taxes.  As these 
taxes increase in application, tax treaties may cover a 
shrinking portion of revenues collected by countries. 
Finally, as contracts forged through negotiation, 
individual treaties deviate to various degrees from the 
standards set in the OECD Model.76  Treaties among OECD 
member countries generally adhere to the pattern and main 
provisions of the OECD Model.77  Treaties between developed 
  
 75 The OECD Model describes double taxation as “the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same 
subject-matter and for identical periods.”  OECD MODEL , supra note 21, at 7. 
 76 Even if their language is similar or identical, tax treaties may also vary 
due to differing interpretations under the domestic law of each country, or, in the case 
of U.S. treaties, pursuant to the agreement of the competent authorities.  This is 
authorized under art. 3, ¶ 2 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, which state that any 
term not defined in the treaty is defined under the laws of each country as of the time 
the treaty is applied—i.e., “internal law, as periodically amended.”  Postlewaite & 
Makarski, supra note 39, at 741 (adding that “[w]hen countries take different 
approaches to treaty interpretation, serious consequences may result, such as double 
taxation or the avoidance of any taxation.”).  The U.S. Model adds, “or the competent 
authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the provisions of Article 25 (the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure).”  U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 3, ¶ 2.  Variation 
among treaties is also authorized under Article 25 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, 
which states that the competent authorities “shall endeavor to resolve by mutual 
agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application” of 
the treaty, and that the competent authorities “may also consult together for the 
elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for” in the treaty.  U.S. MODEL, 
supra note 56, art. 25, ¶ 3; OECD Model, supra note 21, art. 25, ¶ 3; UN Model, infra 
note 78, art. 25, ¶ 3.  The U.S. Model adds that “[t]he competent authorities also may 
agree to increases in any specific dollar amounts . . . to reflect economic or monetary 
developments.”  U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 25, ¶ 4.  Finally, treaties may deviate 
from the international consensus even if they closely follow the model treaties due to 
periodic updates to the models and commentary thereto.  For example, recent revisions 
to the OECD Model commentary with respect to the definition of a permanent 
establishment potentially broadens the scope of such provisions and may ultimately 
lead to a revision of Article 5 of the OECD Model.  See, e.g., Richard M. Hammer, The 
Continuing Saga of the PE: Will the OECD Ever Get it Right?, 33 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 
472 (2004) (suggesting that the current commentary should be revised because it is 
“murky and ambiguous,” and arguing for the incorporation of a clear de minimus rule 
in the OECD Model itself).   
 77 See OECD MODEL, supra note 21, at 10.  However, improvements and 
advances in international business and tax practices contribute to increased deviation 
even among OECD countries.  Recently, so-called “double non-taxation” provisions 
have been introduced in new treaties.  These provisions directly contravene existing 
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and less-developed countries, however, often contain non-
standard provisions.  These provisions generally derive from a 
third model tax convention, first promulgated by the United 
Nations in 1980 (the UN Model).  The UN Model was the 
product of a series of discussions and meetings of an Ad Hoc 
Group of Experts formed in 196778 to address concerns that the 
OECD Model (and, by association, the U.S. Model) was not 
appropriate for tax treaties involving non-reciprocal cross 
border activity.79 
2. Assumption of Reciprocal Activity 
The U.S. and OECD Models are directed at and work 
most effectively between two nations that export capital and 
transfer services in roughly reciprocal amounts.  When treaty 
countries export and import capital to each other, each acts as 
a source country to investors from the other.  Under these 
circumstances, tax treaties coordinate taxation without 
necessarily causing an imbalance in revenue allocation 
between the two countries: revenues given up by countries in 
their “source” role are recouped in their “residence” role.80  
Consequently, such treaties are expected to have little revenue 
effect on either country.81   
  
OECD provisions.  See, e.g., Michael Lang, General Report, in INT’L FISCAL ASSOC., 
DOUBLE NON-TAXATION, 89a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 77 (2004).  
 78 The Group of Experts included members from Latin American, North 
American, African, Asian, and European countries.  The group also had observers from 
the IMF, the International Fiscal Association, the OECD, the Organization of 
American States, and the International Chamber of Commerce.  See UNITED NATIONS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ARTICLES OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE 
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (Jan. 1, 
1980); see also UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED 
NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES viii (2001) [hereinafter UN MODEL]. 
 79 See Leif L. Mutén, Double Taxation Conventions Between Industrialised 
and Developing Countries, in DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES BETWEEN INDUSTRIALISED 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; OECD AND UN MODELS, A COMPARISON 3 (Kluwer Law 
and Tax’n Pubs. 1990).  
 80 For example, while the U.S. may give up revenue by refraining from taxing 
dividends paid to foreign persons under a treaty, it recoups the loss by collecting the 
full tax on dividends paid by the foreign country to U.S. residents (without reduction 
under the foreign tax credit provisions, since under the treaty, the foreign country does 
not tax the dividend).  See I.R.C. §§ 61 (U.S. persons taxed on income from whatever 
source derived) and 901 (foreign tax credit generally allowed only when foreign tax has 
been paid or accrued).  
 81 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 105TH CONG., REPORT 
ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH IRELAND 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (“The proposed treaty is 
estimated to cause a negligible change in . . .  Federal budget receipts.”); STAFF OF THE 
S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE 
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If instead the flow of capital moves primarily from one 
country to another, reciprocity is lost.  One country becomes 
primarily the source, or host country, while the other becomes 
primarily the residence, or home country.  Because LDCs are 
typically capital importing countries, their primary role under 
tax treaties is as a source country.82  Residence jurisdiction will 
therefore be minimally exercised by LDCs.83  In such cases, a 
tax treaty shifts tax revenues inversely to the flow of capital.  
As a result, while the contraction of taxing jurisdictions is 
technically reciprocal in the treaty document, the one-sided 
  
UNITED KINGDOM 16, 17 (Comm. Print 2003) (same).  The balance apparently holds 
even in the case of complete exemption of source-country taxation.  See, e.g., STAFF OF 
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
TO THE INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 39 (Comm. 
Print 2003) (suggesting that the new zero-rate for tax on direct dividends “would 
provide immediate and direct benefits to the United States as both an importer and an 
exporter of capital[,]” and that “[t]he overall revenue impact of this provision is 
unclear, as the direct revenue loss to the United States as a source country would be 
offset in whole or in part by a revenue gain as a residence country from reduced foreign 
tax credit claims with respect to Australian withholding taxes”). 
 82 The flow of capital between the U.S. and an LDC typically originates from 
the former and flows to the latter, although this is less true with respect to the 
“advanced developing” countries: Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Brazil.  
See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: 
Using The Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 198 
(2003) (stating that LDCs are generally not typical destinations for portfolio 
investment); see also Conventions and Protocols on Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital; Treaty 
Doc. 103-29, Sweden; Treaty Doc 103-30, Ukraine; Treaty Doc. 103-31, Mexico; Treaty 
Doc. 103-32, France; Treaty Doc. 103-33, Kazakhstan; Treaty Doc. 103-34, Portugal; 
Treaty Doc. 104-4, Canada:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th 
Cong. 18 (1995) (statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (capital flows are typically nonreciprocal between the U.S. 
and LDCs).  Most multinationals are residents of developed countries.  Of the top 100 
multinational companies (as measured by foreign assets), just five are residents in 
LDCs (Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Venezuela).  United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], World’s 100 Non-financial TNCs, Ranked 
By Foreign Assets, 2000, http://www.unctad.org/templates/Download.asp?docid=3812 
&lang=1&intItemID=2443 [hereinafter UNCTAD World 100 Non-Financial TNCs] 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005).  Of the top fifty multinational companies from developing 
economies, none are based in the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.  UNCTAD, The Top 50 
TNCs from developing economies, ranked by foreign assets, 2000, 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Download.asp?Docid=3811&lang=1 (last visited Nov. 
11, 2005). 
 83 It may be minimally exercised even in the absence of treaties, since few 
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa assert worldwide taxation on their residents.  Among the 
exceptions are Angola, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
and Uganda.  See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 35.  Ghana, the subject of the 
case study presented in Part III of this Article, generally exercises territorial taxation 
but imposes tax on certain repatriated earnings.  See Republic of Ghana, Internal 
Revenue Act, 2000, Act 592, Part III, Div. I, § 6(1)(a) [hereinafter G.I.R.A.] (residents’ 
assessable income includes that “accruing in, derived from, brought into, or received in 
Ghana”). 
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flow of capital towards the LDC as source-country ensures that 
only that country experiences a true contraction of its taxing 
jurisdiction.  The provider of the capital, namely the developed 
country, preserves its rights as the country of residence just as 
if the treaty had never been concluded. 
Non-reciprocal contraction by the LDC occurs in the 
context of portfolio investment as its role as the source country 
requires it to reduce its tax rates on dividends, interest, and 
royalties, while the residence country preserves the right to 
impose full taxation on these items.  Non-reciprocal contraction 
also occurs in the context of active business income, as 
threshold rules for taxing business income prevent source-
country taxation of certain activities, such as storing and 
displaying goods or building and construction activities.84  
These threshold rules are embodied in the concept of the 
“permanent establishment.”   
The permanent establishment rules are found in Article 
5 of each of the US, OECD, and UN model treaties.  Under 
these rules, the source country agrees to refrain from taxing 
business income unless it is attributable to business activities 
that meet physical presence requirements, and even then, in 
some cases, only if the activities are conducted for a given 
duration or rise to a substantial enough level.85  Accordingly, 
under the U.S. and OECD Models, a permanent establishment 
is generally deemed to exist and therefore create taxing 
jurisdiction in the source country if business activities are 
conducted through a fixed place of business and consist of more 
than “peripheral or ancillary activities.”  Certain activities, 
such as building and construction, however, must last more 
than a year in order to be deemed “permanent 
establishments.”86   
Responding to the non-reciprocal aspects of 
relationships between developed and less developed countries, 
the UN Group of Experts sought to preserve source-country 
taxation in tax treaties in its Model.  Thus, the UN Model 
provides for lower thresholds by shortening duration and 
  
 84 See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 5; OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 5; 
UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 5.   
 85 Id.   
 86 See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 5, ¶ 3.  Peripheral and ancillary 
activities include exploratory or preparatory functions such as research and 
development, as well as activities considered incidental to the economic source of the 
income, such as storage, display, or delivery of goods.  The U.S. Model is virtually 
identical to the OECD Model. 
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presence requirements and including certain activities not 
included in the OECD and U.S. Models.87  For example, under 
the UN Model, a permanent establishment may arise after a 
duration of as low as six months for certain activities,88 fewer 
ancillary activities are excluded,89 and more income is 
attributed to permanent establishments via a force of 
attraction rule.90  Nevertheless the UN Model limits source-
country taxation simply by using the permanent establishment 
concept at all.  In the absence of the treaty, the source country 
would typically provide little or no threshold to taxation.91   
In addition, the UN Group of Experts determined that 
in treaties between developed and less developed countries, 
  
 87 It otherwise adheres in large part to the OECD Model, and the two have 
become more similar.  Indeed, the relevance of the UN Model has diminished 
significantly and it may be seen as irrelevant to the extent developed countries agree to 
higher source-based tax in their tax treaties, which they have done to a significant 
extent.  See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 
(1999) (“There seems [to be] little need for a separate model for developing countries.”). 
 88 UN MODEL, supra note 76, art. 5, ¶ 3.  In paragraph 3(a), building and 
construction activities and related supervisory activities are a permanent 
establishment if they last more than six contiguous months; in paragraph 3(b), 
consulting services are a permanent establishment if such services continue for a 
cumulative (even if non-contiguous) six months.  In the OECD model, building and 
construction activities must continue for more than twelve months to constitute a 
permanent establishment, related supervisory activities are not included, and there is 
no parallel provision regarding consulting services.  For a comparison of the OECD and 
UN Model permanent establishment provisions, see Bart Kosters, The United Nations 
Model Tax Convention and Its Recent Developments, ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULLETIN, 
January/February 2004, at 4, available at  http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/other/unpan014878.pdf. 
 89 For example, in the OECD and U.S. Models, the use of facilities or 
maintenance of a stock of goods for delivery is specifically excluded from the definition 
of permanent establishment, while in the UN Model it is not.  Compare U.S. MODEL, 
supra note 56, art. 5, ¶ 4, and OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 5, ¶  4, with UN 
MODEL, supra note 78, art. 5, ¶ 4. 
 90 The OECD and U.S. Models provide source-country taxation only of profits 
that are attributable to the permanent establishment.  The UN Model includes profits 
attributable to the sale of the same or similar goods or merchandise as those sold 
through the permanent establishment and profits from the same or similar business 
activities as those conducted through the permanent establishment.  Compare U.S. 
MODEL, supra note 56, art. 7, ¶ 1, and OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 7, ¶ 1, with 
UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 7, ¶ 1. 
 91 For an argument that thresholds are appropriate, should be used even in 
the absence of a treaty, and should be made more uniform (in the current models, there 
are different thresholds for different activities), see Brian J. Arnold, Threshold 
Requirements for Taxing Business Profits Under Tax Treaties, in THE TAXATION OF 
BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES 55 (Brian J. Arnold et al. eds., 2003).  The 
permanent establishment concept has been revised and updated to adapt to changes in 
business and technology over the years, but generally remains consistent with the 
original version introduced in the first OECD Model Tax Convention, which was 
released in 1963.  OECD, Income and Capital Draft Model Convention, Draft 
Convention For the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, art. 5, ¶¶ 1-2 (July 30, 1963). 
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higher source-based taxation of passive items is appropriate.  
Just how high, however, has not been determined.  While the 
OECD Model provides recommended maximum source-country 
tax rates for dividends (5% on “direct dividends” (those paid to 
corporate shareholders holding at least 10% of the paying 
company’s stock) and 15% on “regular dividends” (all other 
shareholders)), interest (10%), and royalties (0%),92 and the 
U.S. Model is virtually identical (but provides zero source-
country taxation of interest),93 the UN Model leaves the source-
country taxation of these items to be established through 
bilateral negotiations.94  Thus, the UN Model implies that 
higher tax rates are appropriate in tax treaties with LDCs, but 
declines to recommend exactly what rate is appropriate.95   
The U.S. has frequently used the provisions and 
concepts of the UN Model in its tax treaties with developed as 
well as less developed countries.96  For example, the U.S. 
income tax treaties with Barbados, Canada, China, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Venezuela each provide for 
lower permanent establishment duration requirements, 
narrower definitions of ancillary and preparatory activities, 
higher source-country tax rates on passive income items, or a 
combination of these features.97 
  
 92 See OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 10, 11, 12. 
 93 U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 11. 
 94 UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 11 (including a blank line and a 
parenthetical that states “the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations”). 
 95 See generally U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, arts. 10, 11, 12; OECD MODEL, 
supra note 21, arts. 10, 11, 12; UN MODEL, supra note 78, arts. 10, 11, 12. 
 96 Kosters, supra note 88, at 9. 
 97 See U.S.-Barbados Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; Convention with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., art. 5, Sep. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087 
[hereinafter, U.S.-Canada Treaty]; U.S.-China Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Cyprus 
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9; U.S.-Cyprus Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Egypt 
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Est., art. 5, Jan. 
15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-55 (1999); U.S.-India Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; 
U.S.-Indonesia Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Kaz., art. 5, Oct. 24, 1993, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-33 (1996); U.S.-Korea Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9; Convention for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Lat., art. 5, Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-57 (1999); 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Lith., art. 5, Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
105-56 (1999); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
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The consequence of preserving source-country taxation 
to overcome non-reciprocal capital flows, however, is that it 
undermines the relief of double taxation ostensibly sought as 
the primary purpose for entering into the treaty in the first 
place.  This has been a source of problems for drafters and 
negotiators of tax treaties and treaty models, who appear to 
have difficulty determining whether it is better for LDCs to 
preserve source-country taxation so as to allow the source 
country to collect the maximum amount of revenues, or to 
relieve source-country taxation so as to attract the maximum 
amount of foreign investment.98  As discussed in Part IV, this 
choice is one of the main reasons tax treaties have become 
obsolete for many investors in LDCs.  Yet new U.S. tax treaties 
with LDCs continue to be sought, and when concluded, they 
continue to provide for higher source-country taxes on passive 
income items, even, on occasion, when the treaty rate exceeds 
that of the internal laws of the LDC.99 
The importance of reciprocity as requisite to make a tax 
treaty appropriate is demonstrated in the current composition 
of the U.S. tax treaty network.  Like all developed countries, 
the U.S. has tax treaties in place with all of its major reciprocal 
trading partners100 and with the bulk of its foreign direct 
investment sources and destinations.101  Yet, with just 55 
comprehensive tax treaties covering 62 countries, the U.S. 
network is comparatively small relative to the other major 
  
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex., art. 5, Sep. 18, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-7 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Treaty]; U.S.-Morocco Treaty, 
supra note 4, art. 4; U.S.-Philippines Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Thailand Treaty, 
supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Tunisia Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; Agreement for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Turk., art. 5, Mar. 28, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-30 (1997); 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Ukr., art. 5, Mar. 4, 1994, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 104-30 (2000); U.S.-Venezuela Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5. 
 98 Tsilly Dagan eloquently illustrated the conundrum and presented a game 
theory rationale that explains why many LDCs have opted for the latter.  See generally 
Dagan, supra note 40. 
 99 See discussion infra at note 139. 
 100 Major trade partners include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
and the U.K.  WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 577 (entries listing major import and 
export partners).  The most glaring exception in the U.S. tax treaty network is probably 
Brazil, with whom negotiations have been stalled since 1992.  See infra note 307. 
 101 The tax treaty network currently covers approximately 78% of U.S. foreign 
direct investment, as valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ 
equity in and net outstanding loans to foreign affiliates).  See Maria Borga & Daniel R. 
Yorgason, Direct Investment Positions for 2003: Country and Industry Detail, SURV. OF 
CURRENT BUS., JULY 2004, at 40, 49 [hereinafter Borga & Yorgason], 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2004/07July/0704dip.pdf.  
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economies of the world,102 and it excludes more than 20% of 
U.S. foreign direct investment.103  Moreover, just 16 U.S. tax 
treaties are with LDCs,104 as compared with an average of 22 in 
other leading economies.105  To the extent that tax treaties 
influence the flow of trade and investment between the U.S. 
and the rest of the world, they may impact U.S. foreign 
investment, trade, and aid efforts to LDCs.  The following Part 
explores whether more complete U.S. tax treaty coverage could 
impact these flows by considering a hypothetical tax treaty 
with Ghana, an LDC in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
III. U.S. TAX TREATIES WITH LDCS: CASE STUDY OF GHANA 
This Part presents as a case study a hypothetical tax 
treaty between the U.S. and Ghana, based on current U.S. tax 
treaty standards with respect to LDCs.  The case study 
demonstrates that the lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and 
the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa may be explained in large part 
by the fact that in today’s global tax climate, these agreements 
would not significantly impact the global tax burden that 
current or potential international investors are facing.  As a 
result, even if governments are committed to concluding them, 
and even though they are supported by academics, 
practitioners, and lawmakers, tax treaties between the U.S. 
and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa would nevertheless be 
largely ineffective in stimulating cross-border investment and 
trade.   
  
 102 In contrast, the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with over 100 
countries; Canada and the Netherlands with over 80.  See Ernst & Young, supra note 
35, at 134-36, 263-65, 641-42, 984-85. 
 103 See supra note 69. 
 104 See supra note 4.  When the tax treaty with Sri Lanka (signed in 1985) 
entered into force in July of 2004, it was the first new country added to the tax treaty 
network since the treaty with Slovenia entered into force in 2001, and the first new 
LDC since Venezuela was added in 1999. Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, U.S.-Slovn., June 21, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-9 (2001); U.S.-Venezuela 
Treaty, supra note 4; U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4. 
 105 Seventeen of the thirty OECD countries have larger LDC tax treaty 
networks.  For example, the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with 60 LDCs, 
Canada has 40, Germany has 36, Norway has 35, and Italy and Sweden each have 32.  
Compiled from Ernst & Young, supra note 35, at 129-31, 250-52, 287-88, 426-28, 652-
53, 855-57, 938-39 and the LexisNexis Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, 
http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?250064 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
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A. Ghana as Case Study Subject  
The pursuit of a tax treaty with Ghana, a nation of 20 
million people in West Africa, would support current U.S. 
commercial and non-commercial interests in this country.  
Non-commercial interests of the U.S. in Ghana include 
longstanding diplomatic ties,106 an interest in fostering 
economic stability in this region of the world for humanitarian 
reasons, and recognition that conditions of extreme poverty like 
those found in Ghana are a potential breeding ground for 
terrorism.107   
U.S. commercial interests in Ghana include both trade 
and investment relationships.  Several large foreign 
investments in Ghana are owned by U.S. companies,108 and 
U.S. companies continue to express interest in pursuing 
business opportunities in this country.109  U.S. investment in 
  
 106 See U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Ghana, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (“The United 
States has enjoyed good relations with Ghana at a nonofficial, personal level since 
Ghana’s independence.  Thousands of Ghanaians have been educated in the United 
States.  Close relations are maintained between educational and scientific institutions, 
and cultural links, particularly between Ghanaians and African-Americans, are 
strong.”). 
 107 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, allegedly linked to the 
international terrorist organization al-Qaeda, provide perhaps the most illustrative 
reason for U.S. interests in brokering peace and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
U.S. also has interests in Sub-Saharan Africa for social justice reasons, including the 
extreme poverty faced by a majority of the population in this region.  For a discussion 
of the importance of pursuing tax treaties in response to these issues, see Brown, supra 
note 7, at 48-51. 
 108 These include the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd (Valco), a Ghanaian 
aluminum manufacturing company that is jointly owned by Kaiser Aluminum Corp. (a 
Texas corporation owning 90%) and Alcoa Inc., (a Pennsylvania corporation owning 
10%); Regimanuel Gray, a construction company jointly owned by Regimanuel Ltd. (a 
Ghanaian company) and Gray Construction (a Texas corporation); and Equatorial 
Bottlers, a bottling company wholly owned by the Coca Cola Company (a Delaware 
corporation).  See the company websites of Valco at http://www.alcoa.com/ghana/en/ 
home.asp, Regimanuel Gray at http://www.regimanuelgray.com/about.asp, and 
Equatorial Bottlers at http://www.ghana.coca-cola.com (each describing the respective 
companies’ U.S. ownership and Ghanaian operations). 
 109 See, e.g., Newmont to Start up in Ghana, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney, 
Australia), Dec. 22, 2003, at 59 (discussing the purchase by Newmont Mining Corp., a 
Delaware corporation, of the Ahafo gold mine in Ghana); Elinor Arbel, AMR, Pier 1 
Imports, Sun Microsystems: U.S. Equity Movers Final, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 16, 
2004 (discussing plans by Alcoa Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, to buy and restart an 
aluminum smelter in Ghana); G. Pascal Zachary, Searching for a Dial Tone in Africa, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at C1 (quoting a former senior executive of Microsoft who 
surveyed Ghana as a potential regional hub for an information-technology industry, 
and stated that Ghana “has the potential to become for Africa what Bangalore became 
for India;” and discussing Rising Data Solutions, a Maryland corporation that recently 
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and trade with Ghana is generally facilitated by a number of 
factors.  For instance, as a former colony of the U.K.,110 Ghana’s 
official language is English,111 its laws are a blend of customary 
law and English common law, and its regulatory state derives 
much from the British system, thus providing a familiar 
framework for commercial relations.112 
U.S. trade and aid initiatives specifically identify Ghana 
as regionally significant to U.S. trade interests due to its 
central location in an international business corridor that 
stretches from Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire.113  As is the case for 
many LDCs,114 the U.S. is one of Ghana’s principal trading 
partners, although U.S. goods comprise a small portion of 
  
introduced a call center in Ghana, and Affiliated Computer Services, a Dallas company 
that began doing business in Ghana in 2001 and is looking to expand its operations). 
 110 Seventeen LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are former colonies of the U.K.: 
Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; 
all but Somalia and Sudan designate English as their official language; an additional 
four countries list English among their official languages.  See WORLD FACTBOOK, 
supra note 1, at 73, 204, 214, 295, 318-19, 339-40, 359-60, 406, 487-90, 502, 515-16, 
522-23, 536, 562-63, 605-06, 608-09.   
 111 The use of English may be an important factor for the foreign investment 
location decisions of U.S. multinational firms.  See Irving B. Kravis & Robert E. Lipsey, 
The Location of Overseas Production and Production for Export by US Multinational 
Firms 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 0482, 1982), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=262704 (stating that identity of language may significantly 
reduce the costs of foreign investment activities).   
 112 U.S. multinational companies may prefer to invest in countries with which 
they have economic, political, linguistic, or cultural ties.  JOHN H. DUNNING, THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF BUSINESS:  THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S 37-43 (1993) (discussing 
geographical clustering of multinational companies). 
 113 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON U.S. 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT 5 (2003), http://www.agoa.gov/ 
resources/annual_3.pdf.  Ghana is also poised to be the financial hub of a West African 
monetary zone (WAMZ) that was expected to be established in July 2005 but is now 
targeted for implementation in 2009.  See, e.g., HON. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, M.P., 
MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA FOR THE 2004 FINANCIAL YEAR § 
2(43) (2004); Peter J. Obaseki, The Future of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
Programme, 5 W. AFR. J. OF MONETARY AND ECON. INTEGRATION 2, 4 (2005).  When 
established, the WAMZ will facilitate commerce in the region by introducing a single 
currency (the ECO) in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
For information on ECOWAS, see the ECOWAS Home Page, http://www.sec.ecowas.int 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
 114 The U.S. is a principal export partner to 55% of LDCs, and a principal 
import partner to 40%.  Compiled from WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 16, 93, 99, 
104, 109, 111, 126, 129, 131, 139, 156, 174, 176, 182, 203, 205, 215, 236, 296-97, 320, 
322, 339, 341, 360, 382, 385, 404, 407, 491, 524, 564.   
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Ghana’s total imports.115  As a result, like most of the LDCs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is a relatively untapped market for 
U.S. exports.116  
Trends in U.S. trade and investment interests in Ghana 
support the notion that increasing investment in this country is 
a viable goal, which is being advanced by current efforts in 
executing international agreements.  For example, U.S. trade 
with Ghana increased following the enactment and 
implementation of AGOA.117  Nevertheless, U.S. investment in 
Ghana remains relatively slight by global standards.118   
Low levels of investment in Ghana may be explained by 
a number of factors including several non-tax barriers to 
investment.  For instance, Ghana’s low level of infrastructure 
has been blamed as a major impediment to increased 
investment.119  Examples of Ghana’s infrastructural 
shortcomings include obvious physical burdens such as poorly 
  
 115 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GHANA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE 
FY2002, ch. 1, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr-
80318e.html (stating that “[i]n the past, Ghana conducted most of its external trade 
with Europe, but trade with the United States is becoming increasingly significant”).  
Ghana’s import market is currently dominated by Nigeria, contributing 21.3% of all 
imports, followed by China with 8.7% and the U.K. with 6.7%. WORLD FACTBOOK, 
supra note 1, at 215.  The U.S. is its fourth-largest partner, contributing 5.6% of total 
imports.  Id.  In comparison, the U.S. is currently a principal exporter to 18 other LDCs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing 50% of imports in Namibia, 42.3% in Eritrea, 31% 
in Equatorial Guinea, and between 12% and 19% in Angola, Chad, and Ethiopia.  Id. at 
16, 111, 174, 176, 182, 385. 
 116 As a potential export market, Ghana and other LDCs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are also important to the U.S. labor market.  See John Cochran, Not Out of 
Africa: Bush Visits Africa—But Why Now?, ABC NEWS REPORT, July 8, 2003, available 
at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/africa030708_bush.html (last visited June 
11, 2003) (“Over 100,000 U.S. jobs depend on exports to Africa . . . .”). 
 117 Since 2000, when AGOA was first implemented, U.S. exports to Ghana 
have grown steadily, but imports from Ghana have decreased.  UNITED STATES 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA (2000), http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/332/I0516x3.htm. 
 118 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2003), http://www.unctad.org/ 
en/docs/wir2003_en.pdf [hereinafter WIR 2003]. 
 119 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GHANA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE 
FY2003, ch. 7, § A1, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/ 
en/gr109073e.html (stating that infrastructure shortcomings have impeded domestic 
productivity and discouraged foreign direct investment).  Along with the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa, which experienced a large and continuing decline in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in tandem with the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, Ghana’s 
share of global foreign investment has dropped significantly over the past few years, 
and it is considered an underperformer with respect to its FDI potential.  Id.  Its 40% 
decline in FDI from 2001 to 2002 mirrors the experience of the continent, to which FDI 
declined as a whole from $19 billion in 2001 to $11 billion in 2002 (a 41% decline).  
These declines are sharp when compared to that for global FDI, which declined as a 
whole by 21% in the same period.  See WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 3, 14. 
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maintained roads,120 interruptions in electricity,121 a lack of 
clean water,122 and a paucity of institutions such as schools and 
hospitals.123  Equally problematic are Ghana’s excessive 
administrative requirements and bottlenecks, as well as other 
barriers to the entry and operation of businesses by foreign 
persons.124  For example, Ghana continues to struggle with land 
and property protection,125 restricts foreign ownership of real 
  
 120 As John Torgbenu, a taxi driver in Accra, describes the multitude of 
certifications needed to obtain a cab license in Ghana: “Cars must be road-worthy, but 
the roads need not be car-worthy.”  Interview with John Torgbenu, Taxi Driver in 
Accra, Ghana (2003) (on file with author). See also Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policies of the Government of Ghana for 2003-05, ¶ 8 (March 31, 2003) 
[hereinafter MEFP] (“Ghana’s basic infrastructure continues to remain in very poor 
shape.  The building of roads, ports, and communication networks . . . have been 
driving forces behind the government’s efforts to secure a predictable flow of external 
financing for infrastructure development.”). 
 121 Despite the presence of West Africa’s largest hydro-electric plants at Volta 
Lake in northern Ghana, electricity outages are such a frequent phenomenon that 
individuals, businesses and institutions that can afford generators have them, and put 
them to use on a regular basis.  Fueling the modernization process is one of the key 
developments sought in connection with Ghana’s requests for IMF funding.  See MEFP, 
supra note 120. 
 122 Ghana is among the majority of LDCs in the world that have not developed 
an improved water supply.  See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WATER SUPPLY, 
SANITATION AND HYGIENE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/ 
hygiene/en/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
 123 Low levels of education, literacy, and health care issues are among the 
institutional issues Ghana faces.  See, e.g., GEORGE GYAN-BAFFOUR, THE GHANA 
POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY: POVERTY DIAGNOSTICS AND COMPONENTS OF THE 
STRATEGY 4 (2003), http://www.casmsite.org/Documents/Elmina%202003%20-%20 
Workshop%20-%20Poverty%20Reduction%20-%203.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).  
 124 Much of these administrative regimes are a lasting legacy of colonization, 
under which the European nations imposed severe market controls to preserve the 
resources of their colonies for their exclusive use.  See, e.g., FRANCIS AGBODEKA, AN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GHANA 126-27 (1992).  For an overview of ease of entry issues 
for LDCs generally, see JEFFREY C. HOOKE, EMERGING MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
FOR CORPORATIONS, LENDERS, AND INVESTORS (2001) (discussing the entrenched 
obstacles to entry in LDCs); see also Leora Klapper et al., Business Environment and 
Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10380, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10380.pdf 
(finding that bureaucratic entry regulations are a significant burden that hampers the 
entry of firms into foreign markets). 
 125 Courts in Ghana are overwhelmed with land disputes.  See, e.g., Joseph 
Coomson, Country Achieves Below 40 Percent Delivery, GHANAIAN CHRONICLE, Aug. 18, 
2005 (discussing “many land disputes among traditional authorities” and stating that 
there are currently “more than 62,000 land disputes . . . being heard at the courts”).  
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property,126 and has only recently dismantled regulations that 
completely closed several industries to foreign investors.127   
As part of its approach to poverty reduction and 
economic growth through the creation of a business-friendly 
environment, Ghana’s current administration has pledged to 
make significant improvements to its infrastructure.128  The 
reduction of administrative obstacles, combined with greater 
certainty with regard to the legal and regulatory regime, is 
credited with a recent surge in foreign investment from South 
Africa to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.129  It is hoped 
that this surge will be followed by increased investment from 
other countries, including the U.S. 
An increased share of foreign investment is also 
expected to lead to spillover effects that would remedy some of 
the current deficiencies in physical infrastructure.  Limited 
spillover effects have been achieved recently in connection with 
Ghana’s gold mining operations, which have provided funding 
  
 126 The inability to own land translates to an inability to use land as collateral 
for financial transactions, which is a key to economic growth.  See Enrique Gelbard & 
Sérgio Pereira Leite, Measuring Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 18 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/105, 1999), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99105.pdf. 
 127 See WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 36. 
 128 HON. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, M.P., MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC 
PLANNING, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
GHANA FOR THE 2003 FINANCIAL YEAR ¶ 22 (2003) (pledging the government’s 
“commitment to deliver a macro-economic environment that underpins our strategy for 
growth and poverty reduction”); HON. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, M.P., supra note 113, at ¶ 4 
(pledging to continue to “create an enabling environment for wealth creation”).  See 
also various documentation in connection with IMF lending, including the MEFP, 
supra note 120.  
 129 Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2003, at W1 (“It’s safer to go in, it’s easier to get materials in and out, easier to 
repatriate your profits,” according to Keith Campbell, a managing director of a South 
African risk management firm and vice-chairman of the South Africa-Angola Chamber 
of Commerce).  The overhaul of economies has often been initiated by the international 
lending organizations, which have faced much criticism and been the subject of much 
debate in the face of the apparent failure of many of their reform efforts.  However, the 
extreme opposite approach, as unfortunately presented in the case of Zimbabwe, 
illustrates the need for some fundamental certainty in dealing with foreign businesses 
in order to attract foreign investment and maintain a stable economy. See, e.g., Michael 
Wines, Around Ruined Zimbabwe, Neighbors Circle Wagons, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, 
at A4 (describing the “fiscal and political collapse” of that country since it began seizing 
white-owned farms in 2000); David White & John Reed, Showdown over Pariah State 
Leaves the Commonwealth Divided and Frustrated, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003 
(discussing ramifications of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the British Commonwealth); 
Tony Hawkins, Zimbabwe Dollars Cut 80% at Auction, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004 
(stating that massive currency devaluation is in line with market expectations for 
Zimbabwe). 
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to improve transportation routes.130  In Nigeria, one of Ghana’s 
close neighbors, investors in the telecommunications industry 
funded the installation of communication networks throughout 
the country.131  Ghana’s growing telecommunications industry 
may draw like commitments from future investors.132  However, 
the components of infrastructure that are not produced by 
spillover, such as the legal and regulatory framework that 
protects businesses and creates an environment for growth, 
generally must be directly supported and funded by the 
government.133   
Despite the infrastructural obstacles present in Ghana, 
U.S. investment in this country continues to grow, albeit 
slowly.  The following Section explores whether and how such a 
tax treaty between the two countries might affect investment 
in Ghana. 
  
 130 Ghana’s gold mines have recently sparked interest from foreign investors, 
who will spend millions of dollars to upgrade and develop operations following years of 
neglect and under-maintenance of these operations, because they expect productivity to 
increase dramatically and produce significant profit as a result.  See Mr. Jonah Goes to 
Jo’burg, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2004, at 56 (AngloGold (South Africa) expects to spend 
between $220 and $500 million to upgrade its newly acquired Ghanaian gold mine 
(Ashanti Goldfields)); Newmont to Go for Ghana Gold, ADVERTISER (S. Austl.), Dec. 22, 
2003, Finance at 50 (Newmont (U.S.) plans to spend about $350 million to develop its 
recently-acquired Ghanaian gold mine (Ahafo)).  See also Big-Game Hunting, 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 2003, at 57; Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont OKs Project in Ghana; 
Gold Producer Invests $350 Million in W. African Mine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 
19, 2003, at B2; and Gargi Chakrabarty, Latest Global Hot Spot for Gold Mining: 
Ghana, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 30, 2003, at B1. 
 131 South Africa’s Vodacom recently spent $119 million building a cellular 
network in the Congo, a critically impoverished country that has only recently emerged 
from devastating civil war.  South Africa’s MTN Group spent approximately $1.75 
billion building cellular networks in five different Sub-Saharan Africa countries ($900 
million in Nigeria alone), and experiences a 40% profit margin in these markets—
despite having to build power generators to overcome a lack of stable power sources 
and a transmission network to connect cities and towns across the country—compared 
to its 30% return at home in South Africa.  Itano, supra note 129. 
 132 See Zachary, supra note 109. 
 133 Coercion of various forms may induce companies to provide such 
infrastructure in the absence of voluntary action.  For example, in 2003 foreign oil 
workers were kidnapped in Nigeria in an effort to extract a promise from a foreign 
company to build a school or a health center.  See Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Area Mired in 
Poverty, DAILY GRAPHIC (Ghana), Dec. 3, 2003, at 5.   Clearly no government should be 
encouraged to rely on these kinds of tactics to build adequate infrastructure, but the 
fact that citizens of a nation are willing to engage in illegal acts to secure public goods 
illustrates the tensions and pressures facing both international businesses and the 
governments struggling to attract such businesses.  
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B. Structure of a Tax Treaty Between Ghana and the U.S. 
As discussed in Part I, the U.S. Model serves as the 
template for all new tax treaties negotiated by the Treasury 
Department, though the OECD Model and other recent treaties 
are also consulted.  Thus, in structure and overall content, a 
tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana would emulate the 
model treaties, especially the U.S. Model, to a substantial 
degree.  However, in negotiations with LDCs, the Treasury 
Department also consults the UN Model.134  As a result, these 
treaties usually contain several standard deviations from the 
U.S. Model, described in reports and technical explanations as 
“developing-country concessions.”135  They are called 
concessions because they typically concede U.S. residence-
based taxing jurisdiction in favor of greater source-country 
taxation.136   
An example of a U.S. treaty with an LDC, as compared 
to the U.S. Model Treaty, demonstrates the operation of these 
  
 134 See, e.g., Department of the Treasury Technical Explanation of the 
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, Mar. 14, 1985, as Amended by a Protocol Signed at Washington on Sept. 20, 
2002, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tesrlanka04.pdf (“Negotiations also 
took into account the [OECD Model], the [UN Model], and recent tax treaties concluded 
by both countries.”). 
 135 This designation has been consistently propounded throughout U.S. tax 
treaty history, and continues virtually unchanged today.  Compare, e.g., STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX 
TREATY (AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF INDIA 10-11 (Comm. Print 1990) (“The proposed treaty contains a number 
of developing country concessions . . . providing for relatively broad source-basis 
taxation.”), and STAFF OF S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 101ST CONG., REPORT ON THE 
TAX CONVENTION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA 2-8 (Comm. Print 1990) ,  with STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF 
SRI LANKA 18, 64 (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY] 
(describing these deviations as substantive, and outlining the major provisions). 
 136 EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 135, at 64.  To the extent 
that source-based taxing jurisdiction is theoretically more justifiable, the term 
“concession” is something of a misnomer.  See discussion in Part II.B.  Nevertheless, as 
much source-based jurisdiction has been ceded in favor of residence-based jurisdiction 
in the evolution of the model treaties, a reversal of this norm, especially in the case of 
non-reciprocal capital flows, can in theory shift greater tax revenue collection to the 
country of source.  By so doing, it requires the residence country to revert to the role of 
relieving double taxation via the generosity of the foreign tax credit, discussed supra, 
note 43 and accompanying text.  However, the theory that revenues are conceded under 
these provisions only holds if the source country actually imposes and collects the tax.  
This is an assumption which cannot be relied upon in today’s global economy, as 
discussed infra Part IV.B.2. 
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concessions.  At the time it was entered into, the U.S. tax 
treaty with Jamaica was deemed to be the “precedent for 
negotiations” with other LDCs.137  At twenty-four years of age, 
that treaty is substantially out of date, as many tax laws in the 
U.S. (and presumably in Jamaica) have changed significantly 
since it entered into force in 1981.138  However, the principle of 
enlarging source-country taxation found in the U.S.-Jamaica 
treaty continues to appear in new tax treaties with other 
LDCs.139  Therefore, the following discussion uses the U.S.-
Jamaica treaty to model the terms that might be expected in a 
U.S.-Ghana tax treaty, should one be concluded. 
In the U.S. tax treaty with Jamaica, as in most U.S. tax 
treaties with LDCs, the expectation that non-reciprocal capital 
flows may negatively impact the LDC is addressed by 
preserving source-country taxation.  This is mainly 
accomplished through modifications to the articles dealing with 
the determination of thresholds for taxing income from 
business activities (the permanent establishment provision) 
and those dealing with the taxation of passive-type income 
(dividends, interest, and royalties provisions).140   
First, under the permanent establishment concept, 
source-country taxation is enlarged by expanding the definition 
to allow the LDC to impose taxation on more of the business 
profits earned by foreign persons in the source country.  Thus, 
in the U.S.-Jamaica treaty, the permanent establishment 
provision mirrors the structure of the U.S. and OECD Models, 
but incorporates the UN Model approach, shortening the 
threshold durational requirement from one year to six months 
in the case of construction, dredging, drilling, and similar 
activities.141  It also provides that the furnishing of services can 
create a permanent establishment if continued for more than 
  
 137 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF 
PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY (AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL) BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND JAMAICA 4 (Comm. Print 1981).  
 138 U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4. 
 139 Evidently, in some cases this is done regardless of the pre-existing legal 
framework in the LDC.  See EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 135, at 62 
(stating that “it is not clear that . . .  Sri Lankan laws have been fully taken into 
account” since “[s]everal of the articles of the proposed treaty contain provisions that 
are less favorable to taxpayers than the corresponding rules of the internal Sri Lankan 
tax laws”). 
 140 See supra Part II.C. 
 141 U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, ¶ 2(i).  The activity must 
continue for “more than 183 days in any twelve-month period,” and at least 30 days in 
any given taxable year to constitute a permanent establishment.  Id. 
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ninety days a year.142  Finally, it provides that maintaining 
substantial equipment or machinery in a country for four 
months can constitute a permanent establishment.143  One or 
more of these deviations from the U.S. Model are found in most 
U.S. tax treaties with LDCs.144  Consequently, similar 
provisions would likely be suggested, negotiated, and agreed to 
in a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty. 
Second, under the passive income provisions, source-
country taxation is enlarged by allowing the source country to 
impose tax rates on these items of income in excess of the 
maximum rates provided in the U.S. Model.  The U.S. Model 
allows source-country tax rates of no more than 5 and 15% on 
direct and regular dividends, respectively, and 0% on interest 
and royalties.145  In contrast, the U.S.-Jamaica treaty provides 
for source-country tax rates of 10% on direct dividends,146 15% 
  
 142 Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(j).  The services must continue for “more than 90 days in any 
twelve-month period” and at least 30 days in any given taxable year to constitute a 
permanent establishment.  Id. 
 143 Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(k).  The equipment or machinery must be maintained “for a 
period of more than 120 consecutive days,” and at least 30 days in any given taxable 
year to constitute a permanent establishment.  Id. 
 144 See, e.g., U.S.-India Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, ¶ 2(j)-(l) (providing for the 
same concessions as in the U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4).  Similar deviations are 
also in U.S. tax treaties with other developed countries.  See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Treaty, 
supra note 97, art. V, ¶ 4 (providing that the use of a drilling rig or ship for more than 
three months in any twelve-month period constitutes a permanent establishment).  
Since Canada is a developed country, the Senate Report does not mention the UN 
Model as a source of consultation, and the Joint Committee does not identify the 
deviation as a concession by the U.S., but rather explains that “[t]he shorter period was 
included in the treaty at the insistence of Canada which felt that a one-year period was 
unrealistic, given the adverse conditions of drilling in the Canadian offshore and the 
fact that the drilling season there is very short.”  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION AND PROPOSED PROTOCOLS 
WITH CANADA (Comm. Print 1984); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH 
CONG., EXPLANATION OF TAX CONVENTION WITH CANADA (Comm. Print 1980).  Narrow 
thresholds continue to appear in newly-signed U.S. tax treaties, such as the one with 
Bangladesh.  See supra note 42, art. 5, ¶ 3, 6 (not yet in force). 
 145 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text; U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, 
arts. 10-12.  The OECD Model differs from the U.S. Model in that it provides for 
source-country tax rates of 5% in the case of dividends held by 25% or greater corporate 
shareholders, 15% in the case of all other dividends, 10% in the case of interest, and 
zero in the case of royalties.  OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 10-12.  As discussed in 
Part II.C, the UN Model leaves the maximum tax rate blank, implying that countries 
should negotiate a higher rate in the case of treaties between developed and less 
developed countries.  UN MODEL, supra note 78, arts. 10-12. 
 146 U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 138, art. X, ¶ 2(a). 
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on regular dividends,147 12.5% on interest,148 and 10% on 
royalties.149 
Despite the general trend of higher source-country 
taxation of passive income items in U.S. tax treaties with 
LDCs, source-country taxation of certain items of passive 
income have recently been lowered in a number of U.S. tax 
treaties, including one with Mexico, arguably an LDC.150  The 
U.S. agreed to eliminate source-country taxation on direct 
dividends paid with respect to stock held by foreign controlling 
parent companies151 in a recent protocol to the U.S.-Mexico tax 
treaty.152  A most-favored nation provision in the original 
treaty153 caused the elimination of source-country taxes on 
these direct dividends when the U.S. negotiated the same 
provision in recent treaties and protocols with Australia,154 
Japan,155 and Britain.156  According to Treasury officials, the 
elimination of source-country tax on direct dividends earned by 
foreign controlling companies reduces tax barriers and 
  
 147 Id. art. X, ¶ 2(b). 
 148 Id. art. XI. 
 149 Id. art. XII. 
 150 Second Additional Protocol that Modifies the Convention for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, U.S.-Mex., art II Nov. 26, 2002, T.I.A.S No. 108-4 (providing a zero-rate for 
dividends in the case of certain controlled companies), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/mexico.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Mex.].  Mexico 
is not designated as an LDC in the World Factbook, but is included by reference to its 
OECD membership within the definition of developed countries, even though its per 
capita GDP of less than $10,000 would align it with other LDCs.  See supra note 20. 
 151 Those owning at least 80% of the foreign subsidiary’s stock.  Id. art. II, 
§ 3(a). 
 152 See id. art. II. See also Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on the Additional Protocol Modifying the Income Tax Convention with Mexico, U.S.-
Mex., § VI(A), Mar. 13, 2003, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-4 (2003) (protocols eliminate tax 
on certain direct dividends). 
 153 See Protocol Amending the U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 97, ¶ 8(b) (“If 
the United States agrees in a treaty with another country to impose a lower rate on 
dividends than the rate specified . . . both Contracting States shall apply that lower 
rate instead of the rate specified . . . .”). 
 154 Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., art. 
VI, May 2003 [hereinafter Australia Protocol]. 
 155 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, art. XI, Nov. 6, 2003, 
T.I.A.S. No. 108-14 (2004) [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Treaty]. 
 156 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. 
X, July 24, 2001, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ 
uktreaty.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Treaty].  
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increases the economic ties between the partner countries.157  
Following the logic of this position, a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty 
should involve a significant lowering, if not complete 
elimination, of source-country taxation of dividends.  The fact 
that the U.S. tax treaty with Mexico very recently adopted this 
position would seem to support the expectation of a similar 
provision in a tax treaty with Ghana.  
However, the more likely result is that in a U.S.-Ghana 
tax treaty, source-country tax rates on dividends would be 
closer to the rates found in the Jamaica treaty than those 
found in the Mexico treaty.158  No recent U.S. tax treaty with an 
LDC has incorporated a zero rate for dividends paid to 
controlling company shareholders, and all provide for 
maximum source-country tax rates on passive income items 
that are higher than those provided in the U.S. Model.159 
Thus, as in the case of the permanent establishment 
provisions, the higher source-country rates that are typical in 
U.S. tax treaties with LDCs would likely be suggested, 
negotiated, and agreed to in a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty.160  Using 
  
 157 See STAFF OF S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE 
CONVENTION WITH JAPAN (Comm. Print 2003) (noting that many bilateral tax treaties 
to which the United States is not a party eliminate taxes on direct dividends, that the 
EU’s Parent-Subsidiary Directive achieves the same result, and that the United States 
has signed treaty documents with the U.K. and Australia that include provisions 
similar to the one in the Mexico protocol); see also John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of the 
Treasury, Remarks at the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty Signing Ceremony (Nov. 6, 
2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js975.htm (stating that the new 
U.S.-Japan Treaty “will significantly reduce existing tax-related barriers to trade and 
investment between Japan and the United States” and “will foster still-closer economic 
ties” between the two countries). 
 158 The Mexico treaty now provides for a maximum of 5% source-country 
taxation on direct dividends, 10% on regular dividends, and 0% on direct dividends 
paid to foreign companies with a controlling interest in the paying company.  See U.S.-
Mexico Treaty, supra note 97, art. 10. 
 159 See, e.g., U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4, arts. X-XII (providing 
maximum rates of 15% on all dividends and 10% on interest and royalties); U.S.-
Bangladesh Treaty, supra note 42 (same rates as in the U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty).  Other 
than the lower rates on dividends, the U.S.-Mexico Treaty is consistent with other tax 
treaties with LDCs in that it provides for maximum source-country tax rates of 15% on 
interest and 10% on royalties.  See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 97. 
 160 The U.S. tax treaties with Greece (a developed country), the former 
countries of the U.S.S.R. (each a transition country), and Trinidad & Tobago (an LDC), 
each provide for a maximum 30% source-country tax rate for dividends, and those with 
Israel (a developed country), India, and the Philippines (each an LDC), provide a 
maximum 25% rate.  See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Feb. 20, 1950, U.S.-
Greece, 5 U.S.T. 47, TIAS 2902; TIAS; Convention on Matters of Taxation, Jun. 20, 
1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., TIAS 8225, 27 U.S.T. 1; U.S.- Trin. & Tobago Treaty, supra note 4; 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr.; U.S.-India 
Treaty, supra note 4; U.S.-Philippines Treaty, supra note 4.  The newest U.S. tax 
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the U.S.-Jamaica treaty and other recent treaties with LDCs as 
a guide, a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty could be expected to provide 
maximum source-country tax rates of 10 to 15% on direct 
dividends, 10 to 15% on regular dividends,161 and 10% on 
interest and royalties. 
The narrower permanent establishment thresholds and 
higher source-country tax rates are expected in a U.S.-Ghana 
tax treaty because they continue to appear in other U.S. tax 
treaties with LDCs.  They appear in these treaties because it is 
believed that they will provide some benefit to the governments 
of the LDCs entering into these agreements.  Yet, the 
overriding purpose of these treaties is the same as that for 
treaties exclusively between developed countries: they are 
supposed to relieve double taxation and therefore increase 
cross-border investment between the partner countries.  The 
next Part explores the extent to which either of these goals are 
achieved under this hypothetical tax treaty between Ghana 
and the U.S.  
IV. THE EFFECT OF A U.S.-GHANA TAX TREATY ON 
POTENTIAL U.S. INVESTORS  
Assuming that Ghana is otherwise a viable destination 
for U.S. investment as described above, a tax treaty between 
these two countries would theoretically complement U.S. 
investment interests as well as its trade and aid initiatives.  
However, this Part demonstrates that in today’s global tax 
climate, a tax treaty that follows the international standards 
set forth in the model treaties will likely be ineffective in 
achieving its goals as a result of several interrelated 
phenomena. 
First, the scope of tax treaties appears to be too narrow 
in the context of these LDCs.  Second, double taxation appears 
to be disappearing in international transactions involving these 
LDCs as a result of the widespread reduction in taxation 
  
treaty, with Sri Lanka (an LDC), provides for a 15% tax rate on all dividends.  See 
Proposed Tax Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (testimony of the Staff of the Joint Comm. on 
Taxation).  The Sri Lanka treaty was considered by the Senate in February, 2004 
together with the U.S.-Japan Treaty, which provides for zero taxation on certain 
dividends paid to controlling shareholders.  See id. at 18, 20.  
 161 Forty-eight of the U.S. tax treaties currently in force provide a rate of 10-
15% on regular dividends.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
PUBL’N 901, U.S. TAX TREATIES 33-34 tbl. 1 (2004); U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 
4, art. 10. 
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caused by global tax competition and an ever-increasing 
availability of opportunities to avoid and evade income 
taxation.  Third, there may be little differential between tax 
treaties and statutory law in the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Fourth, tax treaties may have little impact on multinational 
investment behavior in the face of non-tax characteristics of 
LDCs, such as inadequate infrastructure.  Finally, tax treaties 
may offer little more than perception about the commercial and 
legal climate of a country for foreign investment.  Because of 
the impact of each of these factors on global commercial 
activity, a tax treaty between Ghana and the U.S. would yield 
an insignificant impact on investment and trade between these 
two countries.   
A. Non-Comparable Taxation 
The first phenomenon that tends to reduce the potential 
benefit of a tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana is the fact 
that U.S. multinational companies are likely to face non-
income types of taxation in Ghana.162  Like many LDCs, Ghana 
relies on a broad range of taxes that are not relieved under tax 
treaties, including consumption, excise, and trade taxes.163  The 
reliance on trade and excise taxes is historical, arising out of 
practices that have since been abandoned in developed 
countries in favor of personal income taxation and, outside of 
the U.S., consumption taxation, typically in the form of the 
value added tax (VAT).164 
VATs are relatively new to LDCs, having been 
introduced in the 1970s and 1980s largely as part of tax 
reforms initiated by international monetary organizations as a 
condition of lending.165  Prior to the introduction of the VAT, 
  
 162 That is, if they face any taxation at all.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 163 See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 4, at 452 (“[W]e have noted a trend where 
developing countries question the desirability of maintaining high source based 
taxation, but need to find alternative sources of revenue . . . many of them rely to a 
lesser extent on OECD type tax systems . . . instead, there is a greater reliance on 
value added taxes and asset taxes.”). 
 164 The shift from trade to income and consumption taxation in the U.S. and 
other developed countries is discussed in WEISMAN, supra note 41, at 14, 42, 44; 
William D. Samson, History of Taxation, in THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SYSTEM 33-
37 (Andrew Lymer & John Hasseldine eds., 2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, 
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 
1576 (2000). 
 165 From 1950, when the VAT emerged in its modern form, until 1980, many 
countries shifted from consumption taxes to payroll (social security) taxes, and since 
1980, many countries have begun to shift from personal income taxes to VAT.  KEN 
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many LDCs, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed 
the customs of the developed world that were introduced under 
colonization and relied heavily on trade taxes for revenue.166  
The increased focus on the VAT was part of an overall effort to 
gradually reduce and, eventually, completely eliminate taxes 
on international trade.167 
In Ghana, the government introduced a 20% VAT in 
1995 but quickly repealed it in the face of violent protests.168  
After a lengthy educational campaign, the government 
reinstated the VAT in 1998, this time at 10%.169  Since then, the 
VAT has not led to a decrease in any other taxes.  A decrease in 
international trade taxes (tariffs) and excise taxes was initially 
realized soon after introduction of the VAT, but this trend has 
since reversed itself, and tariffs are currently increasing as a 
percentage of total revenues collected.170  Moreover, a 
temporary rise in corporate income taxation that accompanied 
the introduction of the VAT appears to have leveled off and 
corporate tax rates are currently decreasing.171  As a result, the 
introduction of the VAT in Ghana has lead to an overall 
increase in taxes that are not addressed by treaties.172 
  
MESSERE ET AL., TAX POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN OECD COUNTRIES 28 (2003).  
See also Malcolm Gillis, Tax Reform and the Value-Added Tax: Indonesia, in WORLD 
TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 227, 227 
(Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McClure, Jr., eds., 1990); Stewart, supra note 11, at 
169. 
 166 Vito Tanzi, Taxation in Developing Countries, in TAX SYSTEMS IN NORTH 
AFRICA AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1, 8-9 (Luigi Bernardi & Jeffrey Owens, eds., 1994) 
(discussing revenue composition in LDCs).  In Sub-Saharan Africa trade taxes 
averaged about 27% of total revenues from 1994 to 1999.  Percentages of revenues 
collected attributable to trade taxes ranged from 5% in Angola, to 49% in Uganda.  
Scott Riswold, IMF VAT Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, WTD, Sep. 1, 2003, at 8.  For a 
discussion of the impact of colonization on tax systems in LDCs, see Stewart, supra 
note 11, at 145. 
 167 Such efforts have been encouraged by international monetary 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as 
part of an overall tax reform package introduced in various forms as a condition to 
ongoing lending arrangements.  Stewart, supra note 11, at 170. 
 168 Ghana, Despite Its Successes, Is Swept by Anti-Tax Protests, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 1995, at A6 (describing VAT-related riot that led to five deaths). 
 169 Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund 
and Tax Reform, 2 BRIT. TAX REV. 146, 155 (2004). 
 170 The remainder of Ghana’s tax revenue derives from excise taxes, mainly on 
petroleum.  INSTITUTE OF STATISTICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE STATE 
OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IN 2002, at 26, 28-29 tbl.2.4 (2003) [hereinafter STATE OF 
THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY]. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax:  Some 
International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1350 (1996) (theorizing the 
obsolescence of the U.S. tax treaty network in the event the U.S. adopts a consumption 
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Finally, investors are likely to encounter non-
comparable taxation in Ghana as a result of government stake-
holding in many formerly state-owned enterprises.  For 
example, cocoa produced in Ghana is not subject to income 
taxation,173 but is subject to levy by the Ghana Cocoa Board, a 
monopsony for the international sale of Ghanaian cocoa 
products.174  Similarly, the government extracts mining profits 
by owning shares in all mining operations and requiring the 
payment of dividends on such shares.175  Thus, a focus on the 
VAT, income, international trade, and excise taxes in Ghana 
provides only an incomplete picture of the full burden of 
taxation imposed in this country.  As treaties focus only on 
income taxation, they address taxation in LDCs to a very 
limited degree. 
B. Decreasing Global Tax Burdens 
As non-comparable taxation increases, income taxation 
is decreasing throughout the world.  As a result, multinationals 
investing in LDCs may face little or no income taxation on 
their foreign earnings.  First, taxation may be reduced or 
eliminated by residence countries pursuant to rules that 
provide assets in offshore companies an indefinite suspension 
(deferral) of residence-based taxation.  Second, taxation may be 
reduced or eliminated by source countries pursuant to tax 
incentives that eliminate taxation for specified durations or 
perpetually.  Third, taxation by both countries may be reduced 
  
tax and repeals the income tax, since “[f]undamentally, income tax conventions apply 
to taxes on ‘income and capital’”).  There are some tax treaties that address 
consumption taxes, specifically VAT.  However, in most countries, the VAT employed is 
destination-based, meaning that exports are exempt from VAT and imports are subject 
to VAT.  As a result, double VAT is avoided to a certain extent without need for 
international agreement (some double taxation will continue to occur to the extent 
there are varying definitions of exempted and included items).  The inconsistency 
occurs to various degrees in every country that employs a VAT.  Developed countries, 
however, continue to rely more heavily than LDCs on income taxation, which is 
relieved by, and therefore necessitates the continued existence of, tax treaties. 
 173 G.I.R.A., supra note 83, § 11(7) (“income from cocoa of a cocoa farmer is 
exempt from tax”). 
 174 Acting as the intermediary between farmers and the global market, the 
Ghana Cocoa Board has the “sole responsibility for the sale and export of Ghana cocoa 
beans,” and delivers only a fraction of realized proceeds to farmers, thus imposing a 
gross basis tax that currently approximates some 33%.  See Ghana Cocoa Beans 
Production, Export And Prices, available at http://www.cocobod.gh/corp_div.cfm 
?BrandsID=13.  See also STATE OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY, supra note 170, at 26. 
 175 See Thomas C. Wexler, Introduction to Mining in Ghana, THE MINING 
JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 1995, at 353 (discussing strict government controls over and rights 
in Ghanaian mining operations). 
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or eliminated through strategies of tax avoidance and evasion.  
Finally, taxation by both countries may be reduced or 
eliminated pursuant to express efforts to do so by both taxing 
jurisdictions, usually through a tax treaty.  The combination of 
reduction or elimination of taxation in both countries, whether 
express or not, leads to complete non-taxation176 of 
multinational activities.  As discussed more fully below, the 
resulting lack of taxation obviates the need to pursue tax relief 
under treaty. 
1. Reduced Taxation Through Deferral 
As discussed above, most developed countries impose 
taxation on a worldwide basis, yet most protect this right only 
with respect to certain items of income, allowing suspension of 
taxation on other items to continue indefinitely at the will of 
the shareholders.177  Thus, despite the support for the primacy 
of residence-based taxation that originally served as a major 
reason for entering into tax treaties,178 much residence-based 
taxation is undermined by the persistent allowance of deferral.   
Deferral is antithetical to residence-based taxation.  By 
allowing it, nominally residence-based jurisdictions like the 
U.S. mirror source-based (or territorial) systems by effectively 
providing tax exemptions for foreign income.179   Deferral is 
defended on grounds of neutrality: it is argued that companies 
from residence-based countries like the U.S. face heavier global 
tax burdens than companies from territorial countries, when 
both operate in third countries that impose little or no source-
based taxation.  For example, it is suggested that U.S.-based 
multinational companies operating abroad may be subject to 
little source-based taxation as foreign countries compete to 
attract their investment by offering low tax burdens, but 
because of the U.S. system of worldwide taxation, the U.S.-
based company is still subject to the higher U.S. domestic tax 
rates.  In contrast, it is supposed that multinationals from 
territorial systems will have a tax advantage in the minimally-
  
 176 Sometimes called double non-taxation to indicate the coordinative effort 
that produces it. 
 177 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 178 See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 179 See Peroni, supra note 65, at 987.  Passive income items such as dividends, 
interest, and royalties are generally not eligible for deferral and are therefore subject to 
current tax in the U.S.   
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taxing foreign country because these companies can combine 
low taxation abroad with exemption at home.180   
Based on this argument, deferral continues to be 
vigorously defended under principles of capital import 
neutrality,181 as requisite to allow U.S. companies to compete in 
low-tax countries against the multinational companies of 
territorial jurisdictions.182  That few multinational companies 
are actually residents of purely territorial systems,183 and that 
deferral provides the equivalent of exemption for much of the 
foreign income earned by U.S. multinationals while 
simultaneously providing them with a competitive advantage 
over their domestic counterparts,184 appears to have little effect 
  
 180 See Roin, supra note 63, at 114 (citing deferral proponents who argue that 
“[a]ny businesses that Americans can successfully operate in low tax 
jurisdictions . . . foreign investors can carry on equally well [and that if deferral was 
ended] foreign investors would use their now unique tax advantage to overwhelm their 
American competitors, wherever located.”). 
 181 See discussion of neutrality supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 182 See, e.g., Mark Warren, Democrats Would Increase Taxes on Companies’ 
Income Earned Abroad Repealing the Deferral Rule: The Wrong Answer to U.S. Job 
Losses, 2004 WTD 88-16 (May 3, 2004) (arguing that some countries exempt the foreign 
earnings of their multinationals, U.S. companies would face a higher overall tax 
burden when operating in low-tax jurisdictions in the absence of deferral, and that U.S. 
companies “cannot be expected to succeed if they are handicapped by a 35-percent 
corporate-tax rate on their worldwide income”); National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., 
The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 1999 
WTD 58-37 (Mar. 25, 1999); Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 64 (1999) (statement of 
Fred F. Murray, Vice President for Tax Policy National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_ 
hearings&docid=f:66775.pdf (arguing that “[i]f the local tax rate in the company of 
operation is less than the U.S. rate, . . . competitors will be more lightly taxed than 
their U.S.-based competition,” whether they are locally based or foreign, “unless their 
home countries impose a regime that is as broad as subpart F, and none have to date 
done so”).  The argument is perhaps as old as U.S. taxation itself.  In the newly 
independent United States, import duties were favored over export duties or other 
forms of taxation, because the imposition of either export duties or property taxes on 
farmers would equally increase the price of goods destined for export, thus serving to 
“enable others to undersell us abroad.”  See UNITED STATES IN CONG. ASSEMBLED, 
REPLY TO THE RHODE ISLAND OBJECTIONS, TOUCHING IMPORT DUTIES (1782), reprinted 
in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 100, 105 (Jonathon Elliot, ed. 1996). 
 183 For example, of the top 100 multinationals, eighteen are from generally 
territorial systems (one from Hong Kong, three from Switzerland, one from Malaysia, 
and thirteen from France).  Since France imposes a form of world-wide taxation on low-
taxed earnings of controlled foreign companies, even this number is an exaggeration.  
Other countries may impose worldwide income generally, but exempt the foreign 
income of their multinationals under treaty.  See UNCTAD World 100 Non-Financial 
TNCs, supra note 82. 
 184 Domestic companies are subject to worldwide taxation and cannot 
generally opt to suspend the taxation of their profits.  See generally Clifton Fleming Jr. 
et al., An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering a Proposal to Curtail, Not Expand, 
Deferral, 2000 WTD 20-15 (Jan. 31, 2000) (arguing that deferral is a subsidy for 
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on the efforts of U.S. multinationals to preserve the deferral 
privilege.185 
The effect of deferral is to increase the sensitivity of 
U.S. taxpayers to foreign tax rates, thus forcing source 
countries to continually lower their internal tax burdens so as 
to attract the ever more demanding foreign capital.  Deferral 
thus causes tax competition, as any income taxation imposed 
by a source country, such as Ghana, subjects a potential foreign 
investor to a burden it could otherwise avoid.186  Elimination of 
competition and tax sensitivity could be achieved if all 
countries adhered to principles of capital export neutrality.  
However, this would require international coordination and 
cooperation to a degree that appears overwhelmingly 
unattainable.187 
The consequence is that U.S. multinationals may 
generally avoid U.S. taxation on their foreign income by 
operating through subsidiary companies in source countries,188 
which they generally do.189  As suspension and effective 
  
operating business abroad and that proponents of deferral “have not candidly 
acknowledged the broad nature of the scope of the existing deferral privilege”). 
 185 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
 186 Deferral removes the existing (residual) tax burden, thereby ensuring that 
any tax imposed by a foreign country is a tax wedge.  In the absence of deferral, the tax 
wedge is created by the home country and, outside of limitations on foreign tax credits, 
taxes imposed by the source country do not increase the wedge.  For a discussion of the 
interaction of deferral and the subsequent efforts of source countries to eliminate tax 
wedges, see Dagan, supra note 40, at 952-56. 
 187 See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral 
Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1642 n.8 (2001) (an internationally harmonized 
system is “too utopian to merit discussion”); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Policies for the 
XXIst Century, in VISIONS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS OF THE XXIST CENTURY 9, 28-29 (1997).  
But see Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 
259, 260 (2003) (arguing that there has been a “modelization” of the international tax 
rules that could be built upon to achieve some measure of rule harmonization).  Recent 
developments in the EU indicate that less, rather than more, cooperation is likely.  See 
Joann M. Weiner, EU Governments Fear Increased Tax Competition in Wake of 
Accession, 2004 WTD 81-1 (Apr. 6, 2004); Joe Kirwin, International Taxes European 
Commission Rejects Effort For Harmonized Corporate Tax Rates, DAILY TAX REP., June 
1, 2004, at G-8. 
 188 Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 3-29, 31 
(2004) (multinationals are free to choose to operate through a branch or subsidiary, and 
they will generally choose subsidiary form unless the foreign effective tax rate is 
greater than the U.S. rate or if they benefit from pooling high- and low-taxed earnings). 
 189 For example, several of the largest foreign investments in Ghana are U.S. 
controlled foreign corporations (CFCs), including the Valco, Regimanuel Gray, and 
Equatorial Bottlers, discussed supra note 108.  Operating through a domestic 
subsidiary is also more advantageous from a Ghanaian perspective, since foreign 
companies are subject to strict scrutiny from the taxing and regulatory authorities to 
an extent exceeding that paid to domestic companies.  The differential treatment is 
especially acute in the case of mining and other extractive operations, which are 
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elimination of taxation on foreign income becomes the norm in 
the developed world, LDCs respond accordingly, by 
increasingly offering corresponding tax relief in the form of tax 
incentives.  These incentives have become a standard tool for 
capturing a share of the global flow of foreign investment.190  
2. Reduced Taxation Through Tax Incentives  
Most countries use various forms of tax incentives to 
encourage particular behavior in taxpayers, and neither the 
U.S. nor Ghana is an exception.  The U.S. employs numerous 
tax incentives to attract foreign investment and encourage 
domestic investment.  These provisions are generally embedded 
in the tax base, rather than being reflected in the tax rates.191  
For example, along with the privilege of deferral, tax credits for 
research and development (R&D) and accelerated depreciation 
deductions are among the major tax incentives the U.S. 
offers.192 
  
strictly regulated and limited as to foreign ownership by the Government of Ghana.  
Interview with Bernard Ahafor, Attorney, in Ghana (Dec. 2, 2003).  See also Shay, 
supra note 188, at 31. 
 190 The evidence is perhaps most obvious in regards to the number of countries 
offering tax holidays—over one hundred in 1998 and increasing—and the share of 
foreign investment directed at tax havens that are decried by the OECD for their 
harmful tax practices.  While these countries command a fraction of the world’s 
population and its GDP, they attract a disproportionately large amount of U.S. foreign 
investment capital.  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 164, at 1577, 1589, 1643. 
 191 Since the 1960s, an awareness of the danger of the hidden costs of such 
incentives has led to expenditure budgeting, which quantifies the cost of embedded 
provisions.  For an example, see Analytical Perspectives, supra note 65, at 285 
(explaining the concept of expenditures and providing a selected list).  Incentives 
currently provided in the U.S. tax base include accelerated depreciation and exclusions 
from taxation for certain forms of income such as tax-exempt interest.  Tax incentives 
include any exclusions or exemptions that reduce or defer the tax base.  See generally 
Alex Easson & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives, 2002 WORLD BANK INST. 3 (“[t]ax 
incentives can take the form of tax holidays for a limited duration, current deductibility 
for certain types of expenditures, or reduced import tariffs or customs”).  Ireland and 
Belgium, which offer low rates for foreign investors, are exceptions (and a source of 
consternation to their OECD counterparts) to the general rule of tax base rather than 
tax rate concessions in developed countries.  See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 164, at 
1601. 
 192 Congress first provided a deduction for research and experimental 
expenditures in 1981, because it saw a decline in research activities it attributed to 
inadequacies in the I.R.C. § 174 deduction, which at that time only applied to 
investment in machinery and equipment employed in research or experimental 
activities.  Congress concluded that “[i]n order to reverse this decline in research 
spending . . . a substantial tax credit for incremental research and experimental 
expenditures was needed.”  STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, reprinted in INTERNAL 
REVENUE ACTS, 1980-1981, at 1369, 1494 (1982).  In the same act, Congress provided 
for accelerated depreciation deduction allowances because the existing depreciation 
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Ghana also offers accelerated depreciation deductions 
and R&D credits similar to—but perhaps not as generous as—
those of the U.S.193  However, most LDCs, including Ghana, 
also offer significantly more generous incentives in the form of 
low corporate tax rates and myriad tax exemptions.194  Ghana 
imposes only an 8% tax on income from the export of most 
goods, rates ranging from 16 to 25% for certain industries and 
businesses conducted in certain geographic areas, and complete 
exemption from taxation (tax holidays) for periods ranging 
from three to ten years for new activities conducted in certain 
industries or geographic areas.195  Many LDCs, including 
Ghana, have also set aside geographic areas as havens from 
the normal tax and regulatory regimes (free zones), specifically 
to host manufacturing and processing plants.  In Ghana’s free 
zone, established in 1995, companies enjoy a ten-year tax 
holiday followed by tax rates never to exceed 8%.196 
International organizations such as the World Bank and 
the IMF currently decry the harm that tax holidays cause in 
  
deduction allowances “did not provide the investment stimulus that was felt to be 
essential for economic expansion.”  Id. at 1449.  Enhanced bonus depreciation 
provisions were enacted in 2001 under the theory that “allowing additional first-year 
depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote capital investment, 
modernization, and growth, and will help to spur an economic recovery.”  H.R. REP. NO. 
107-251, pt. 2, at 20 (2001).  Bonus depreciation was expanded in 2003 for the same 
reason.  H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, pt. 2, at 23 (2003) (“increasing and extending the 
additional first-year depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote 
capital investment, modernization, and growth, . . . help to spur an economic 
recovery, . . . [and] increase employment opportunities in the years ahead).  See also 
Richard E. Andersen, IRS Relaxes Rules for Research Credit; Opportunities for R&D-
Intensive Multinationals?, 4 J. TAX’N. GLOBAL TRANSACTIONS 17 (CCH) (Spring, 2004) 
(discussing structures with which foreign and domestic multinationals can use R&D 
credits to generate tax-free profits in the U.S., and citing a 2003 study by Bain & Co., 
entitled Addressing the Innovation Divide, in which it was found that in the past 
decade, European drug makers placed their R&D in the United States versus in local 
expansion by a two-to-one margin). 
 193 G.I.R.A., supra note 83, Third Schedule (depreciation allowance), § 19 
(deductions for research and development expenditures). 
 194 For example, by 1998, over 100 countries had tax holidays.  Avi-Yonah, 
supra note 164, at 1577.  See, e.g., ZMARAK SHALIZI, LESSONS OF TAX REFORM 23 (1991). 
 195 G.I.R.A., supra note 83, §11 (Industry Concessions) & First Schedule, Part 
II (Rates of Income Tax Upon Companies).  Although tax holidays are limited in 
duration, insufficient enforcement prevents the IRS from curbing instances in which 
companies facing expiring tax holidays simply dissolve and reincorporate under a 
different name to restart the clock.  Interview with Kweku Ackaah-Boafo, Esq. (Feb. 6, 
2004) (Discussing Canadian Bogosu Resources, a mining company operating in Ghana 
which reincorporated as Billington Bogusu Gold Limited and again five years later as 
Bogusu Gold Limited, in order to avail itself of tax benefits that otherwise would have 
expired). 
 196 G.I.R.A., supra note 83, First Schedule. 
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depriving LDCs of much-needed revenue.197  The elimination of 
income taxation on corporate taxpayers, coupled with the 
pressure to reduce taxes on international trade, has created 
critical revenue shortfalls in many countries.198  Nevertheless, 
new tax incentives continue to be introduced in both developed 
and less developed countries around the world,199 often in 
response to private sector lobbying.200  Some recent examples 
include the introduction of a free zone in the United Arab 
Emirates,201 a five-year exemption period for audit, accounting, 
and law firms in Singapore,202 and a ten-year corporate tax 
holiday for income from investments of at least €150 million in 
Turkey.203 
As a result of these kinds of initiatives, U.S. 
multinationals may face little or no income taxation on income 
  
 197 See, e.g., Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, in TAX POLICY 
HANDBOOK 279, 282 (Parthasarathi Shome, ed., International Monetary Fund 1995) 
(stating that tax incentives “have proved to be largely ineffective, while causing serious 
distortions and inequities in corporate taxation.”); SHALIZI, supra note 194, at 60 (“The 
use of so-called tax expenditures (tax preferences and exemptions to promote specific 
economic and social objectives) should, in general, be deemphasized.”).  This is a 
reversal of position for the World Bank, which at one point encouraged LDCs to offer 
tax incentives to attract foreign investment and was concerned with the effect 
elimination of tax incentives might have on its assistance projects.  Stewart, supra note 
11 at 169; SHALIZI, supra note 194, at 68-69.  The World Bank has since “recommended 
the removal or tightening of incentives in Argentina (1989), Bangladesh (1989), Brazil 
(1989), Ghana (1989), and Turkey (1987), among others.”  SHALIZI, supra note 195, at 
69.  Tax incentives are also contrary to WTO rules prohibiting tax subsidies.  See WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, Annex 1A, Art. 
1, ¶ 1.1.  However, these provisions are rarely enforced with respect to LDCs.  See 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Martin B. Tittle, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: 
Overview and Current Status 26-28 (2002), available at http://www.iadb.org/INT/Trade/ 
1_english/2_WhatWeDo/Documents/d_TaxDocs/2002-2003/a_Foreign%20Direct%20 
Investment%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf. 
 198 Cordia Scott & Sirena J. Scales, Tax Competition Harms Developing 
Countries, IMF Official Says, 2003 WTD 238-9 (Dec. 10, 2003).  
 199 See, e.g., Kwang-Yeol Yoo, Corporate Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment 
Income 1991-2001 (Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 365, 2003), available at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/48ae491
b8e2db4a9c1256d8e003b567f/$FILE/JT00148239.PDF. 
 200 See, e.g., David Roberto R. Soares da Silva, Tech Companies in Brazil Seek 
Tax Incentives to Promote R&D, 2004 WTD 138-6 (Jul. 19, 2004) (domestic and 
multinational technology companies are currently lobbying for a three-year exemption 
from federal taxes for income from sales of “all new products that contain significant 
technological innovation”). 
 201 Under this new initiative, free-zone companies in Dubai will be exempt 
from income tax.  See Cordia Scott, Dubai Woos Europe With Tax-Free Outsourcing 
Zone, 2004 WTD 118-12 (June 17, 2004). 
 202 Lisa J. Bender, Singapore Launches Tax Incentives for Audit, Accounting, 
Law Firms, 2004 WTD 66-5 (Apr. 5, 2004). 
 203 Mustafa Çamlica, Turkey Plans Tax Holidays for Large Investments, 2004 
WTD 82-8 (Apr. 28, 2004).  
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derived in LDCs.  The impact of tax treaties on activities giving 
rise to such income is therefore minimized, as double taxation, 
and even single taxation, is avoided through unilateral tax 
rules.  However, even if home or source countries nominally 
impose taxation on multinationals, widespread tax avoidance 
and evasion neutralizes these taxes.  Tax treaties appear to 
have little effect in these circumstances. 
3. Reduced Taxation Through Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion  
In the event that deferral or tax incentives are not 
available, multinational companies manage their worldwide 
tax exposure by using tax planning techniques to shift income 
to low- or no-tax jurisdictions through earnings stripping, 
transfer pricing, thin capitalization, and similar means of tax 
avoidance and, in the extreme, tax evasion.204  For example, 
U.S. multinationals typically use over- and under-invoicing to 
assign foreign profits to subsidiaries in tax havens.205  As a 
result, firms can increasingly make physical location decisions 
that are largely independent of tax-related business decisions, 
  
 204 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in 
the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995) (“Transfer 
pricing manipulation is one of the simplest ways to avoid taxation.”); David Harris, 
Randall Morck, Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung, Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational 
Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 277, 301 (Giovannini et al. eds., 
1993); James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations, 
in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401, 414-15 (Alan J. Auerbach 
ed., 1997).  The line between tax avoidance and tax evasion is murky.  Tax avoidance 
generally refers to lawful attempts to minimize taxation, as Judge Learned Hand 
famously noted in Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., 
dissenting) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so 
arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.  Everybody does so, rich or 
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law 
demands . . . .”).  Tax evasion generally encompasses the unlawful and fraudulent 
avoidance of tax accomplished by hiding taxable income and assets from taxing 
authorities.   
 205 See Council of the European Union, Final Draft Report of the Ad hoc 
Working Party on Tax Fraud 16-17 (Brussels, April 27, 2000).  Direct tax fraud is 
typically committed through false invoicing, under- and over-invoicing, non-declaration 
of income earned in foreign jurisdictions, and “use by taxpayers of a fictitious tax 
domicile, with the purpose to evade fulfilling their tax obligations in their country of 
domicile for tax purposes.”  Id. at 4-5.  See also Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals 
Move More Profits to Tax Havens, 2004 WTD 31-4 (Feb. 9, 2004) (although they 
comprise just 13% of productive capacity and 9% of employment, subsidiaries of U.S. 
multinationals located in the top eleven tax havens were assigned 46.3% of foreign 
profits in 2001); HOOKE, supra note 124, at 86-87 (suggesting that to control costs, it is 
“sound operating procedure” for a foreign investor of an export platform in a LDC to 
interpose an offshore bank, and overcharge the foreign company for imported supplies 
and management fees to reduce income in the source country). 
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shifting profits to the most advantageous tax destination.206  
Efforts by governments to curb such practices are abundant207 
but largely ineffective208 in the face of efforts by taxpayers to 
engage in them.209  
In LDCs such as Ghana, where enforcement of the tax 
law has been relatively less of a focus than reform of the tax 
law, tax authorities are all but helpless against these 
practices.210  It is popularly said that Ghanaian companies keep 
three sets of books: one for the banks, showing large profits so 
as to secure financing; one for the Ghanaian Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), showing large losses so as to avoid paying taxes; 
and one set, very closely-guarded by the owners, that contains 
the most accurate information.211  There is no official data 
available regarding whether, and to what extent, U.S. 
  
 206 See Christoph Spengel & Anne Schäfer, International Tax Planning in the 
Age of ICT, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-27 (2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=552061 (arguing that information and commercial technology 
makes geographic distance “less relevant” and allows companies to choose location and 
form of investment on the basis of international tax differentials).  
 207 Transfer pricing rules are a common feature in the tax systems of most 
countries, as are rules denying deductions for interest and royalties in certain cases 
and rules requiring a certain combination of debt and equity (thin capitalization rules).  
See HUGH J. AULT AND BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 420-28 (1997). 
 208 In the U.S., the transfer pricing rules are long and complicated and 
constantly evolving, but still considered inadequate in preventing profit-shifting, as are 
U.S. earnings- and interest-stripping rules.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(j) (2005).  These rules 
are essentially thin capitalization rules, each of which are similarly limited in their 
success in curbing avoidance of U.S. taxation.  For an overview of U.S. efforts to control 
transfer pricing, see generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 204.  For a recent example of the 
failure of interest stripping rules, consider the growing use of Canadian Income Funds 
to avoid the application of I.R.C. § 163(j) (2000).  See, e.g., Jack Bernstein & Barbara 
Worndl, Canadian-U.S. Cross-Border Income Trusts: New Variations, 34 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 281, 283 (April 19, 2004).  
 209 See, e.g., Shay, Exploring Alternatives, supra note 188, at 36 (“The drive on 
the part of taxpayers, multinational and others, to push down effective tax rates has 
accelerated in recent years.”). 
 210 See Stewart, supra note 11, at 181. 
 211 Interview with Margaret K. Insaidoo, Justice, High Court of Ghana, in 
Ghana (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with author); Interview with Bernard Ahafor, Attorney, 
Private Practice, in Ghana (Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with author); Interview with Sefah 
Ayebeng, Chief Inspector of Taxes, Internal Revenue Service, in Ghana (Dec. 11, 2003) 
(on file with author).  The implication is that firms keep separate books in an attempt 
to defraud the government, rather than in the ordinary course of keeping separate tax 
and cost accounting books, for which there is generally no statutory proscription.  See, 
e.g., CHARLES E. HYDE & CHONGWOO CHOE, KEEPING TWO SETS OF BOOKS: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX & INCENTIVE TRANSFER PRICES, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=522623 (arguing that keeping two sets of books with respect to 
transfer pricing is “not only legal but also typically desirable” for many MNEs). 
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multinationals take advantage of enforcement weaknesses.212  
Ghana recently introduced a Large Taxpayers Unit to curtail 
tax evasion, but the Ghanaian IRS relies on the good faith of 
company officials and their independent auditors because the 
resources are lacking to perform audits on all but a few 
companies.213  Given that the overall tax compliance rate is 
estimated to be less than 20% in Ghana, good faith appears to 
be rather elusive.214   
As a consequence of tax avoidance and evasion 
strategies, income is often exempt from taxation even if tax 
nominally applies in the residence country, the source country, 
or both.  In such a taxing environment there is little taxation, 
let alone double taxation, to be relieved by treaty.  
Governments are not unaware of the problem.  Tax avoidance 
and evasion has typically been addressed in treaties through 
information sharing provisions, in which the respective taxing 
jurisdictions agree to assist each other in collecting revenues.215  
  
 212 Anecdotal evidence that multinationals are thought to evade taxation 
where possible is not lacking, however.  See, e.g., Sirena J. Scales, Venezuela 
Temporarily Closes McDonald’s Nationwide, 2005 WTD 26-11 (Feb. 9, 2005) 
(“Venezuela’s Tax Agency (SENIAT) has temporarily closed all 80 McDonald’s 
restaurants in the nation, citing failure to comply with tax rules . . . .”). 
 213 Seth E. Terkper, Ghana Establishes Long-Awaited Large Taxpayer Unit, 
2004 WTD 64-10 (Apr. 2, 2004).  A mid-size taxpayers unit is also in the planning 
stages.  Ayebeng, supra note 211.  A more effective audit process may not be sufficient 
to induce increased compliance, however.  A recent empirical study about Australian 
investors that were accused of engaging in abusive tax transactions argues that 
taxpayers’ level of trust regarding the fairness, neutrality, and respect accorded to 
them by the revenue authorities was correlated to their level of voluntary compliance, 
and that although trust alone should not be relied upon in enforcing a tax system, “a 
regulatory strategy that combines a preference for trust with an ability to switch to a 
policy of distrust is therefore likely to be the most effective.”  Kristina Murphy, The 
Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders, 28 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 2, 187, 203 (2004).  In an interesting twist, South Korea recently 
announced that domestic and foreign companies meeting target job creation goals will 
be free from audits in 2004 and 2005 under a new tax incentive program.  James Lim, 
South Korea Offering Companies that Create Jobs Shield from Audits, 34 Daily Tax 
Rep. (BNA) G-3 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
 214 The compliance rate is an estimate of Ghanaian IRS officials and not an 
official government statistic.  Ayebeng, supra note 211 (estimating compliance at less 
than 20%); Interview with Fred Ajyarkwa, Official, Internal Revenue Service, in Ghana 
(Dec. 11, 2003) (estimating it at 17%). 
 215 The U.S. Model requires contracting states to exchange all relevant 
information to carry out the provisions of the tax treaty or the domestic laws of the 
states concerning taxes covered by the treaty, including assessment, collection, 
enforcement, and prosecution regarding taxes covered by the Convention.  See U.S. 
MODEL, supra note 56, art. 26, ¶ 1.  It also calls for treaty override of domestic bank 
secrecy or privacy laws. The OECD Model does not include the assessment/collection 
language but extends the scope of taxes to “every kind and description imposed on 
behalf of the contracting states.”  See OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 26, ¶1.  It does 
not include an equivalent to the U.S. Model’s secrecy law override.  The UN Model 
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These provisions have a perhaps unintended consequence, 
however.  Introduction of a tax treaty may decrease 
investment, as investors seek to avoid the implementation of 
the information sharing provisions that have become standard 
in tax agreements.216   
The intersection of the taxation of portfolio interest and 
U.S. interest reporting rules illustrates this tension.  The U.S. 
is a potential tax haven for foreign investors because of its zero 
tax on portfolio interest and rules under which banks are 
generally not required to report interest payments made to 
nonresident aliens.217  Efforts to require interest payment 
reporting have consistently met strong resistance by the 
private sector, which argues that such rules would “hinder tax 
competition between nations” and “undermine [the] global shift 
to lower tax rates and international tax reform.”218  Several 
members of Congress echo these sentiments, arguing that 
expanded reporting rules “would likely result in the flight of 
hundreds of billions of dollars from U.S. financial institutions” 
and could cause “serious, irreparable harm to the U.S. 
economy.”219  The implication is that while the U.S. does not 
  
limits assistance to taxes covered by the Convention as in the U.S. Model, and 
explicitly adds that information exchange is intended to prevent fraud or evasion of 
taxes.  See UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 26, ¶ 1. 
 216 Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax 
Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
8834, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8834 (showing a decrease in 
foreign investment upon the introduction of a tax treaty and suggesting that such 
decrease may be the result of the dampening effect tax treaties may have on tax 
evasion due to information sharing provisions); Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties, 
Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment (University of Oregon Economics, 
Working Paper No. 2003-14, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=436502 (“[t]reaties have either a zero or even a negative effect on FDI” 
because they dampen the ability of businesses to engage in tax evasion activities, 
especially through transfer pricing). 
 217 I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 882(a), (c) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-5 (1983).  Canadian 
residents are a current exception to the interest reporting rules, Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-
8(a) (1996), and proposed regulations would extend the reporting requirements to 
include all interest over $10 paid to any nonresident alien individual. Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6049-8(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 50389 (Aug. 2, 2002). 
 218 Katherine M. Stimmel, Free Market Interest Groups Urge Treasury to 
Withdraw Alien Interest Reporting Rules, 16 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-2 (Jan. 27, 2004). 
 219 Alison Bennett, House Lawmakers Ask Bush to Withdraw IRS Interest 
Reporting Rules for Aliens, 69 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-8 (Apr. 10, 2002).  See also Sen. 
Gordon Smith (R-Ore.), Letter on Proposed Nonresident Alien Interest Reporting Rules 
(REG-133254-02) to Treasury Secretary John Snow, TaxCore (BNA) (Feb. 20, 2003) 
(urging Treasury not to move forward with interest reporting rules because it “would 
drive the savings of foreigners out of bank accounts in the United States and into bank 
accounts in other nations,” and expressing the Senator’s failure to understand “why we 
put the enforcement of other nations’ tax laws as a priority at Treasury”). 
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condone tax evasion, there has emerged no political will strong 
enough to counter the private interests benefiting from the 
rules as they currently exist.220   
Similar sentiments may exist in the context of tax 
treaties, especially when the partner country, as in the case of 
Ghana, has a very limited ability to enforce the tax laws prior 
to the introduction of a treaty.  If foreign investors are able to 
avoid taxation in Ghana, for instance through aggressive tax 
planning, a tax treaty that requires or permits Ghana to 
provide tax information to the U.S. taxing authority may not be 
welcome.221  
4. Reduced Taxation Through Tax Sparing 
The proliferation of tax incentives and tax holidays in 
LDCs, coupled with deferral in the U.S. and tax avoidance 
opportunities in both countries, limits the need for tax treaties 
to relieve double taxation.  Since the 1950s, tax sparing has 
been promoted as a way to use tax treaties to increase 
investment to targeted LDCs, even in the absence of double 
taxation.222  Tax sparing prevents residence-country taxation of 
income exempted from tax by source countries,223 by providing 
  
 220 Perhaps recent efforts to create a multinational task force to combat 
abusive tax-avoidance can provide the pressure needed to reform this long standing 
impasse.  See Sirena J. Scales, Multination Task Force Created to Combat Abusive Tax 
Avoidance, 2004 TNT 81-4 (Apr. 26, 2004). 
 221 Moreover, to the extent that a U.S. tax treaty coordinates transfer pricing 
rules, a treaty might increase the taxation of a multinational that could otherwise 
benefit from conflicting domestic standards.   
 222 See generally OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION (1998) 
[hereinafter TAX SPARING].  Recent literature on tax sparing includes Brown, supra 
note 7; Damian Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing 
Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms, 20 VA. TAX REV. 
467, 483 (2000) (arguing that LDCs “need tax holidays to attract foreign investment,” 
and therefore tax sparing is requisite to counter the effect of residual home country 
taxation under tax treaties).  Tax sparing is also defended as justifiable on grounds of 
capital import neutrality, on the basis that it allows American multinationals to 
compete with companies from other exemption-providing countries in the global 
marketplace.  See discussion infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.  However, tax 
sparing violates the concept of capital export neutrality, and has been consistently 
rejected by the Treasury Department on the grounds that tax treaties are supposed to 
relieve double taxation, not eliminate taxation altogether, and that tax treaties are not 
meant to provide benefits to U.S. persons.   
 223 Tax sparing was first introduced in the U.K. by the British Royal 
Commission, which prepared a report in 1953 recommending tax sparing as a means of 
“aiding British investment abroad.”  TAX SPARING, supra note 222, at 15.  Rejected by 
the U.K. in 1957 after several years of debate, tax sparing was enabled in U.K. tax 
treaties as a result of legislative action in 1961.  Id. The purpose of the legislation was 
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that if a source country refrains from taxing income derived in 
its jurisdiction (usually pursuant to a tax holiday), the 
residence country nevertheless grants a tax credit for the 
nominally imposed tax.224   
Thus, under tax sparing, two taxing jurisdictions 
cooperate to exempt multinational companies from income 
taxation in both countries.  Although similar effects could be 
accomplished unilaterally by residence countries,225 tax sparing 
is generally seen as a mechanism that should be offered in the 
context of a tax treaty, as a measure to encourage foreign 
investment to selected LDCs.226  Tax sparing has particularly 
been promoted as a vehicle for investment and aid to the 
nations of Sub-Saharan Africa.227  
There is little evidence, however, that tax sparing 
increases foreign investment.228  On the contrary, tax sparing 
could potentially decrease investment in LDCs, since it enables 
foreign investors to repatriate earnings that they would 
otherwise leave abroad under the protection of deferral.229  As 
  
“enabling the UK to give relief to developing countries for taxes spared under foreign 
incentive programmes.”  Id.   
 224 Many examples and explanations of tax sparing exist.  For an overview of 
tax sparing, see generally Richard D. Kuhn, United States Tax Policy with Respect to 
Less Developed Countries, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261 (1963).   
 225 For example, the U.S. could expand the definition of a creditable tax to 
include certain nominally-imposed taxes.  See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax 
Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries:  A Policy 
Analysis, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265, 268-69 (2003). 
 226 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7; Laurey, supra note 222 (suggesting 
proposals regarding the use of tax treaties to implement foreign aid initiatives by 
encouraging foreign investment through tax sparing).  See also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., 
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-
Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 347 (2001) (suggesting 
that limiting tax sparing to its use in tax treaties “would allow appropriate distinctions 
to be made among nations and would assist the United States in negotiating 
appropriate reciprocal tax concessions for its residents”). 
 227 Brown, supra note 7, at 83 (arguing for tax sparing in tax treaties 
specifically with Sub-Saharan Africa). 
 228 See McDaniel, supra note 225, at 284 (providing an overview of the 
conflicting economic literature regarding the interaction of tax sparing and FDI). 
 229 See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 67, at 469 (deferral encourages “[r]etention 
and reinvestment of earnings by [foreign companies]”); see also Laurey, supra note 222, 
at 484-85 (tax sparing would “allow U.S. multinationals to repatriate earnings based 
on business needs instead of on adverse tax consequences”).  In a 2003 study of the 
annual filings of the companies in the S&P 500, it was found that such companies had 
accumulated over $500 billion in un-repatriated foreign earnings.  ANNE SWOPE, BRUCE 
KASMAN & ROBERT MELLMAN, BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME: REPATRIATION 
LEGISLATION’S FINAL LAP (2004), http://www.morganmarkets.com.  This figure 
represents a trend of ever-increasing “trapped” foreign profits.  Conversely, by acting 
as an incentive to repatriate capital, tax sparing may be advantageous to the U.S. 
economy even though it has long been rejected for policy reasons.  For example, in the 
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such, tax sparing appears fundamentally inconsistent with the 
goal of using tax treaties to increase investment flows from 
developed to less developed countries.  
Moreover, tax sparing increases tax competition by 
creating an additional disadvantage for countries that do not 
have tax holidays, while leaving countries that have a tax 
holiday in effect in the same or worse position as they were 
when only deferral was available.230  The OECD has initiated 
efforts to combat what it terms “harmful tax practices”—in 
essence, any tax regime that undermines residence-based 
taxation by providing tax breaks and refusing to cooperate in 
information sharing.231  Persisting in the allowance of deferral 
and tax holidays while promoting tax sparing seems equally 
inconsistent with the treaty-related goal of protecting 
residence-based tax bases. 
Foreseeing that the ratification of any treaty with tax 
sparing would prompt a surge of lobbying by U.S. 
multinationals seeking the expansion of such provisions to 
other countries, the U.S. has been unequivocal in its rejection 
of these provisions.232  While the potentially negative impact on 
investment in LDCs is one valid reason why tax sparing should 
continue to be rejected, the primary position of the U.S. has 
been that tax sparing inappropriately allows the reduction of 
U.S. taxation of U.S. persons, a result specifically precluded by 
all U.S. treaties currently in force.233   
  
context of the repeal of I.R.C. § 114 (a tax exemption for certain foreign earnings that 
was found to be in violation of WTO standards), legislators enacted a temporary 
reduction in the rate of tax imposed on repatriated profits, citing in support the need to 
direct capital back to the U.S. in the quest to create jobs and boost the economy.  See 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, H.R. 4250, Sec. 101(a) (repealing 
I.R.C. § 114) and Sec. 965 (enacting temporary dividends-received deduction). See also 
STAFF OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108th CONG., Short Summary of 
Conference Report 108-755 2 (October 7, 2004), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legis.asp?formmode=read&id=2117 (last visited Nov. 
26, 2005) (Section 956 “[e]ncourages companies to reinvest foreign earnings in the 
United States”). 
 230 See, e.g., Margalioth, supra note 82, at 198. 
 231 See generally STAFF OF THE OECD FISCAL AFFAIRS COMM., THE OECD’S 
PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004). 
 232 Tax sparing was contemplated but ultimately rejected in tax treaties with 
Egypt, India, and Israel, largely due to the efforts of Stanley Surrey, who argued 
vigorously against the provision.  See Laurey, supra note 222, at 475-76.  Tax sparing 
was also introduced in a tax treaty with Pakistan, but a subsequent change in Pakistan 
law rendered the provision obsolete and the treaty entered into force without it.  STAFF 
OF S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 85th CONG., REPORT ON DOUBLE TAX CONVENTIONS, 
S. Exec. Rpt.. No. 1, 85-2, ¶ 3 (1958).  
 233 This rule is enforced under the “saving clause” found in all U.S. tax 
treaties.  See, e.g., U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 1, ¶ 4.  
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Some LDCs, notably those in Latin America, have 
terminated tax treaty negotiations with the U.S. over the issue 
of tax sparing.234  However, the U.S. position on tax sparing is 
only “one of several obstacles in the way of U.S.-developing 
country tax treaties.”235  In fact, tax sparing is largely 
unnecessary in the quest for complete non-taxation.  As 
discussed above, tax holidays granted by LDCs to investors 
from deferral-granting countries, such as the U.S., are effective 
in providing double non-taxation so long as capital is 
reinvested rather than repatriated.236 
C. Domestic Tax Rates Equal to or Better Than Treaty 
Rates  
In treaties between developed countries, domestic tax 
regimes are often significantly different than treaty-based tax 
regimes.237  This is especially the case with respect to tax rates 
on passive income paid to foreign persons, which are typically 
much higher under domestic statutes than under tax 
treaties.238  LDCs, however, increasingly impose tax rates that 
are much closer to, and in some cases are less than, the typical 
rates provided in treaties.   
For example, dividends paid to foreign shareholders 
would normally be subject to a 10% tax in Ghana, unless the 
company paying the dividend operates in a free zone, in which 
case the tax rate may be zero.239  Thus, Ghana’s statutory tax 
rate is the same as or less than what would be expected under 
  
 234 Laurey, supra note 222, at 471, 493 (many LDCs have “refused to sign U.S. 
tax treaties that do not contain tax sparing clauses,” especially those in Latin America 
because this region “resents the U.S. [residence-based] tax policy”). 
 235 McDaniel, supra note 225, at 292.  
 236 Tillinghast, supra note 62, at 477. 
 237 Some countries have incorporated treaty concepts into their domestic laws.  
For example, permanent establishment thresholds that parallel or closely follow the 
OECD model treaty definition have long been the domestic rule in Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and France.  AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 207, at 432-
34 (1997). 
 238 OECD Model rates do not exceed 15% for dividends, 10% for interest, and 
0% for royalties.  OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 10-12.  In contrast, maximum 
statutory tax rates in OECD countries average 18%, 14%, and 16% on dividends, 
interest, and royalties, respectively.  See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 35 
(calculations on file with author). 
 239 Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most dividends paid to 
nonresidents, but provides tax incentives, including exemptions of taxation on passive 
income paid by domestic companies to foreign investors, as described above.  See 
G.I.R.A., supra note 83, § 2, Schedule I, Part V (2000); see also supra, text 
accompanying notes 195-97. 
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the hypothetical U.S.-Ghana treaty outlined above.240  In 
addition, Ghana’s internal rate is lower than the 15% 
maximum provided in the U.S. Model for regular dividends.241  
Nevertheless, it is higher with respect to direct dividends than 
the maximum 5% provided in the U.S. Model and the zero rate 
for dividends paid to foreign controlling company shareholders 
found in new treaties.   
Because most dividends paid out of Ghana would likely 
constitute direct dividends, many of which would be paid to 
controlling shareholders,242 a treaty rate that followed the U.S. 
Model or recent U.S. treaty practice would reduce taxation on 
U.S. investors in Ghana from the internal rate of 10% (or 
zero)243 to 5% or zero.  However, as discussed above, if U.S. tax 
treaty precedent is followed, it is unlikely that a U.S.-Ghana 
tax treaty would provide for these lower rates.  In fact, if, 
pursuant to the U.S. Model, a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty provided 
for regular dividend taxation lower than 10%, direct dividend 
taxation at 5%, and no source-country taxation of interest and 
royalties, it would be the first and only U.S. tax treaty to do so 
with any country, developed or less developed.244 
If, as a “concession” to Ghana, the U.S. provided that 
instead of a maximum 5% rate for direct dividends, the 
maximum source-country rate would be 10%, the only result 
would be that Ghana’s statutory 10% rate would be 
maintained.245  No benefit in the form of reduced taxation 
would be realized under this agreement.  In fact, if the recently 
concluded U.S.-Sri Lanka treaty serves as a model, a U.S.-
  
 240 See supra Part III.B. 
 241 U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 10. 
 242 See supra, text at note 189. 
 243 The rate depends on whether the payment derives from sources protected 
by a free zone or tax holiday regime. 
 244 The closest rates to these are found in the treaty with Russia, which 
provides for source-country tax rates of 10% on regular dividends, 5% on direct 
dividends, and 0% on interest and royalties.  Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, U.S.-Russ., arts. 10-12, June 17, 1992, K.A.V. 3315 [hereinafter U.S.-Russia 
Treaty].  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N NO. 
901, U.S. TAX TREATIES 33-34 (Rev. May, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. TAX TREATIES] 
(providing rate information in other treaties).  Note that although the IRS published 
this document in May, 2004, it has no information regarding the U.S. tax treaty with 
Sri Lanka, which was signed on March 14, 1985, because it did not enter into force 
until June 13, 2004.  See generally id.  See also U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4. 
 245 The treaty with Ghana would be one of six U.S. treaties with a top 10% 
rate for dividends.  See U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 244, at 33-34 (providing 10% as 
the maximum tax rate on dividends in U.S. tax treaties with China, Japan, Mexico, 
Romania, and Russia). 
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Ghana treaty could even provide for maximum rates that are 
higher than Ghana’s internal rates, though again this could 
hardly benefit current or potential investors.246 
Similarly, Ghana’s statutory rates of 5 to 10% on 
interest and 15% on rents and royalties247 comport with the 
average respective rates offered under other U.S. treaties, 
although the U.S. Model contemplates zero source taxation of 
both.248  Just as in the case of direct dividends, preserving a 
higher rate of tax would be likely under UN Model standards, 
but would generally be a neutral factor for investors.   
Concessions that allow for higher source-country 
taxation of passive income items reflect the concerns addressed 
by the UN Model regarding the worldwide allocation of tax 
revenues.  These concessions are meant to protect the taxing 
jurisdiction of capital importing nations like Ghana against the 
effects of the U.S. and OECD Model treaties, which allocate 
income away from source and towards residence countries.249  
As the case of Ghana illustrates, however, preserving higher 
source-country taxation is a neutral measure at best.  It is also 
contradictory to the notion otherwise promoted by U.S. policy 
makers that reducing tax rates will reduce tax barriers to 
direct investment and thereby increase capital flows between 
countries. 
  
 246 In the U.S. treaty with Sri Lanka, the Joint Committee queries whether 
this result is intended, and supposes that Sri Lanka could raise its rates up to the 
maximum 15% provided, thereby increasing its revenues from foreign investment.  See 
EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 135, at 62-63.  Yet in the same 
document, the Committee proclaims that the treaty will be good for the U.S. because it 
reduces Sri Lankan tax on U.S. investors and provides a clearer framework.  Id.  These 
two positions are difficult to reconcile, as the Joint Committee appears to recognize.   
 247 Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most interest payments, and a 15% 
tax on rents and royalties, with alternate rates ranging from 5 to 15% for certain 
payments, depending on the residence of the recipient and the payor.  G.I.R.A., supra 
note 83, ch. I, Part I, §§ 2, 84; First Schedule, Part IV-VIII. 
 248 With respect to interest, see U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 11.  Thirty-
one existing U.S. treaties, including several of the most recently signed treaties and 
protocols, reflect the goal of zero source-based taxation of interest, rents, and royalties.  
See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 155, art. 11; Australia Protocol, supra note 154, 
art. 7; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 156, art. 11.  Interest tax rates range from 5 to 30% 
in the remaining treaties.  U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 244.  With respect to 
royalties, see U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 12.  Twenty-six existing U.S. treaties, 
including several of the most recently signed treaties and protocols, provide zero 
source-country tax on most royalties.  See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 155, art. 
12; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 156, art. 12.  As in the case of interest, royalty tax 
rates range from 5 to 30% in the remaining treaties.  U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 
244, at 33-34. 
 249 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
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To date there is no consensus regarding the appropriate 
balance of attracting investment through lower tax rates and 
preserving the allocation of revenue to source countries.250  
Preserving source-country revenues has been prioritized on the 
grounds that low taxation has a deleterious effect on 
infrastructure.  In LDCs, providing adequate infrastructure to 
attract multinationals has been a continuous challenge that is 
further complicated by tax competition, a phenomenon that is 
not alleviated by tax treaties.  
D. Inadequate Infrastructure and Non-Tax Barriers  
U.S. investors may be significantly influenced in their 
investment location decisions by broad infrastructure-related 
criteria such as the rule of law and the protection of property, 
as well as the immediate need for a suitable workforce and 
adequate physical infrastructure.251  The need for a suitable 
workforce in turn necessitates basic infrastructure including 
institutions such as schools and health care systems.  In direct 
tension with these needs is the diminishing ability of LDCs to 
finance infrastructural development as they decrease taxes on 
business profits. 
Many countries, including Ghana, offer tax incentives 
such as tax holidays and tax-free zones because attracting 
investment to sustain economic development is deemed of 
greater importance than protecting tax revenues.252  However, 
there is little consensus regarding the effectiveness of tax 
incentives and tax holidays in actually attracting foreign 
investment.  Anecdotal evidence from various countries 
suggests that providing tax incentives to attract foreign 
investment has failed to deliver the promised benefits.253  
Despite a plethora of tax holidays and other tax incentives, few 
  
 250 See, e.g., UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. X-XII (illustrating the lack of 
consensus through the omission of standard rates). 
 251 HOOKE, supra note 124, at 47-49.  For example, a stable macroeconomic 
environment and a well-educated workforce are two factors that correlate with greater 
foreign investment flowing into LDCs.  UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 23.  
 252 Brian J. Arnold & Patrick Dibout, General Report, 55 Cahiers De Droit 
Fiscal International 25, 28 (2001) (“Certain countries . . . are more concerned with 
attracting activity and investment of the multinationals in order to sustain their 
economic development.”). 
 253 See, e.g., Tamas Revesz, EU, Companies Urge Reform of Hungary’s Local 
Industry Tax, 2004 WTD 97-10 (May 14, 2004) (“Although Slovakia offered big 
investment subsidies and tax relief for foreign investors, its budget is in ruins, and the 
resulting forced cuts in government spending (especially transfers to households) have 
triggered serious hunger riots among the most seriously hit Roma population.”).  
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permanent employment opportunities have been created, and 
exports have failed to increase in the many free zones located 
throughout West Africa, including Ghana.254  According to John 
Atta-Mills, former Commissioner of the Ghanaian IRS, 
“experience shows that tax holidays and tax reductions are 
ranked very low in the priority of investors in their choice of 
location for their business,” and that product demand, a skilled 
workforce, and infrastructure are more important to 
businesses.255  
Economic evidence regarding the connection between 
taxation and foreign investment provides little additional 
certainty.  A number of economic studies indicate that 
multinationals are very sensitive to tax considerations, and 
therefore corporate location decisions may be heavily 
influenced by tax regimes in source countries.256  However, 
conflicting studies indicate that taxation is not a significant 
factor in the location decisions of U.S. multinationals.257  
Instead, these studies argue that “market size, labor cost, 
infrastructure quality . . . and stable international relations,” 
among other considerations, are the most important factors for 
location decisions.258  Studies focused particularly on foreign 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa come to the same 
conclusion.259 
  
 254 Papa Demba Thiam, Market Access and Trade Development: Key Actors, in 
TOWARDS A BETTER REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA 97, 101 
(John Igue & Sunhilt Schumacher eds., 1999).  See also supra note 117 (stating that 
trade data indicates imports from Ghana to the U.S. are currently declining.). 
 255 Seth E. Terkper, Tax Measures in Ghana’s 2004 Budget Inadequate, 
Opposition Party’s Presidential Candidate Says, 2004 WTD 63-12 (Apr. 1, 2004). 
 256 For an overview of this economic literature, see Avi-Yonah (2000), supra 
note 164, at 1590-92; James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of 
Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
401, 401-45 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997); James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral 
Responses to International Taxation, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 305, 305-22 (1999). 
 257 See McDaniel, supra note 225, at 280 (providing an overview of some of 
this literature); see also G. Peter Wilson, The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing 
Decisions, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 204, at 196-97, 229 
(arguing that taxes are more influential in location decisions for administrative and 
distribution centers, but they “rarely dominate the decision process” in the case of 
manufacturing locations). 
 258 McDaniel, supra note 225, at 280. 
 259 See, e.g., Elizabeth Asiedu, On the Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different? 1, 6 (2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=280062 (arguing that location-specific factors such as natural 
resource availability may make infrastructure and stability of particular importance in 
the context of investment to Sub-Saharan Africa); World Bank, WORLD BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT SURVEY 2000, available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes (finding as a result of a survey 
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In contrast, recent literature suggests that past studies 
present an incomplete picture of the role of taxation because 
they have focused on source-country corporate income taxes, 
the burdens of which are relatively insignificant as compared 
to the burdens of non-income taxation in source countries.260  As 
a result, these past studies may have obscured the more 
significant influence of non-income taxation on foreign 
investment decisions.261  Since foreign non-income tax burdens 
significantly exceed income tax burdens, these taxes may 
strongly influence the behavior of U.S. multinationals.262  The 
main explanation given for this influence is that non-income 
taxation cannot be credited against U.S. residual taxation.263 
The findings of this literature are consistent with 
earlier studies that suggest the relative importance of taxation 
in a particular country may be increasing with the availability 
of opportunities for avoiding taxation elsewhere.264  However, 
these findings conflict with other studies demonstrating that 
multinationals can use debt financing and transfer pricing 
manipulation to achieve tax neutrality in investment location 
decisions,265 and that despite earlier studies showing a 
connection between tax and foreign direct investment, non-tax 
  
of business including Ghana and fifteen other Sub-Saharan African countries that 
firms investing in these regions indicate less sensitivity to taxation than to corruption, 
infrastructure, crime, inflation, financing, and political stability).  
 260 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign direct 
investment in a world of multiple taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2727, 2728 (2004) (“Foreign 
indirect tax obligations of American multinational firms are more than one and a half 
times their direct tax obligations.”).  In previous studies, James Hines found a “small 
but significant” link between lower source-country taxes and foreign investment levels.  
See McDaniel, supra note 225, at 281; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 164, at 1644.  
 261 See Desai, supra note 260, at 2728. 
 262 See id. at 2729. 
 263 Id. at 2728 (“The role of non-income taxes may be particularly important 
for FDI, since governments of many countries (including the United States) permit 
multinational firms to claim foreign tax credits for corporate income taxes paid to 
foreign governments but do not extend this privilege to taxes other than income taxes.  
As a result, taxes for which firms are ineligible to claim credits may well have greater 
impact on decision-making than do (creditable) income taxes.”).  For an argument that 
the definition of creditable taxes should be broadened to encompass many non-income 
taxes, see generally Glenn E. Coven, International Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: 
Crediting Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 83 (1999).  
 264 See Grubert, supra note 67, at 22, 28 (suggesting that tax rates are 
extremely important to U.S. multinationals in allocating their foreign direct 
investment, especially in the case of manufacturing, and that the relative importance 
of taxes may be increasing). 
 265 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 1315; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. 
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 134 (1992). 
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factors dominate the location decisions of multinational 
firms.266 
Given the possibility that taxation may not be an 
overriding factor in foreign investment location decisions, the 
influence of infrastructure cannot be ignored.  To the extent 
infrastructure is important to potential investors, efforts to 
reduce taxation to attract foreign investment may be 
counterproductive, since raising sufficient revenues is integral 
to the level of infrastructure a country can offer. 267  As tax 
competition ensures less taxation of multinationals, the ability 
of LDCs to fund sufficient infrastructure to attract and sustain 
foreign investment relies more heavily on the ability to tax 
resident individuals, whether directly or indirectly.  
Historically, this has been a great challenge for LDCs.268   
Compliance rates for income and non-income taxation 
are typically very low in Ghana.  It is estimated that 80% of 
business is conducted on the informal market—that is, not 
subject to regulation or taxation because it is conducted in the 
form of cash or barter.269  Thus, only those who work for the 
government or for the few companies that comply with wage 
  
 266 See Haroldene Wunder, The Effect of International Tax Policy on Business 
Location Decisions, TAX NOTES INT’L, Dec. 24, 2001, at 1331-48. 
 267 See Nicholas Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax?, 41 
FOREIGN AFF. 410, 410 (1963) (stating that “[t]he importance of public revenue to the 
underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes 
of accelerated economic progress.”).  See also H. David Rosenbloom, Response to: “U.S. 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: 
Administration and Tax Treaty Issues,” 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 401, 406 (2003) 
(stating that “taxes are, by definition, involuntary exactions”).  Thailand has recently 
taken a slightly different approach.  In June, 2004, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of 
Education, and the Social and Human Development Services Ministry unveiled tax 
incentives for individuals and companies that make charitable donations to social 
development programs including education, museums, libraries, art galleries, 
recreational facilities, children’s playgrounds, public parks, and sports arenas.   The 
government hopes that “[these incentives] will raise funds from the private sector to 
alleviate the poverty crisis in Thailand.”  Sirena J. Scales, Thai Government Announces 
Tax Incentives for Charitable Contributions, 2004 WTD 129-10 (July 6, 2004). 
 268 Kaldor, supra note 267, at 410. 
 269 The agricultural industry contributes significantly to this number, since 
over 60% of Ghana’s population is employed in agriculture (a slightly lower percentage 
than the average of approximately 75% for LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa).  These 
percentages were compiled by averaging the stated percentage for each LDC in Sub-
Saharan Africa from the World Factbook. (Spreadsheet containing data on file with 
author.)  WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/fields/2048.html.  The informal economy also includes most 
professionals such as doctors and lawyers, other service providers, and shopkeepers 
and sellers of goods in local markets.  Interview with Justice Insaidoo, supra note 211; 
Interview with Sheila Minta, Solicitor/Barrister, Addae & Twum Company, in Accra, 
Ghana (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with author). 
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withholding obligations pay their income taxes.270  An 
appearance that the laws are not applied uniformly may in 
turn lead to increased tax avoidance and evasion.271  The 
situation is exasperated in an environment in which corruption 
or mismanagement of public funds also exists.  While Ghana’s 
corruption factor is relatively modest in comparison to many of 
its neighbors in Sub-Saharan Africa,272 the notion persists that 
wealth can be acquired by becoming a government official.273  
These perceptions plague the revenue collection efforts of tax 
agencies in LDCs such as Ghana.274     
The ability of LDCs to collect sufficient revenue to fund 
infrastructure is also challenged by international pressure to 
  
 270 Interview with Justice Insaidoo, supra note 211. 
 271 Murphy, supra note 213, at 201 (“perceptions of unfair treatment” appear 
to affect trust, and “taxpayer resistance could be sufficiently predicated by decreased 
levels of trust”). 
 272 See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003, 215, 220, 
225, 264, available at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2003.html (suggesting 
that although the government faces much criticism in failing to address corruption 
within the civil service, prompting President Kufuor to promise an increase in 
accountability, Ghana’s perceived corruption is much lower than that of many of its 
neighbors in Sub-Saharan Africa).  In extreme comparison stand countries like the 
Congo, where corruption and bribery at all levels are openly acknowledged as requisite 
for survival.  See Davan Maharaj, When the Push for Survival is a Full-Time Job, L.A. 
TIMES, July 11, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Maharaj, Push] (explaining that while 
government employees are not paid a salary, they still show up for work every day to 
collect bribes ranging from “about $5 for a birth certificate to about $100 for an import 
license”).  In Benin, a close neighbor to Ghana, bribes collected from traders trying to 
import illegal goods into Nigeria provide some 15% of the nation’s revenues.  Davan 
Maharaj, For Sale—Cheap: ‘Dead White Men’s Clothing,’ L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at 
A1. 
 273 The phenomenon appears to exist throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.  See 
Transparency International, supra note 272, at 215.  In the Congo, people say that 
“[t]he only ones who have ever gotten rich are the leaders and those with connections.”  
Maharaj, Push, supra note 272.   
 274 The perceptions of a few individuals cannot represent national sentiment, 
nor can such sentiment, even if widespread, indicate the accuracy of the charge.  
However, a perception of unfairness and corruption may undermine the efficacy of a 
tax regime.  A study to quantify the effect of corruption on tax compliance is underway 
in Tanzania, but more research is needed in this area.  A further issue that may be 
significant to the tax collection efforts of LDCs is the perceived misuse of funds by the 
government, whether as a result of corruption or the ineptitude of officials.  Informally, 
this author heard many expressions of dissatisfaction with the ability of the 
government to provide necessary services to the citizenry.  Since that is a common 
complaint in developed countries as well, I do not deal with it here, but only note its 
existence as an additional potential difficulty in raising sufficient revenues from 
individuals.  Finally, the extent to which local conditions and attitudes regarding 
taxation affect the behavior of multinationals is not conclusively established.  It may be 
that multinationals generally conduct their business operations fundamentally in 
compliance with the laws in force, regardless of the degree to which their compliance is 
monitored or enforced, simply because their global operations may be subject to 
scrutiny by other governments or the public.  However, evidence proving (or 
disproving) this theory appears to be lacking in the economic literature.   
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open markets and reduce trade barriers.275  To the extent that 
Ghana continues to rely heavily on trade taxes for its revenue, 
recent developments in tariff reduction at the WTO may cause 
additional revenue shortfalls in the future.  Ghana also faces 
difficulty in finding consistent resources to fund infrastructure 
because success in collecting revenues from excise taxes, 
royalties, dividends, and similar payments may depend on 
fluctuating global market prices for exported commodities.   
Finally, Ghana’s ability to fund infrastructure is subject 
to uncertainty due to its reliance on assistance from foreign 
donors.276  In 2002, Ghana received large amounts of foreign 
aid, much of which was connected to the peaceful transition of 
power through the democratic process.  But the amount of aid 
has fallen recently, and it is expected to continue to decline as 
finances are directed to other countries or fall off as a result of 
donor fatigue.277  The consequence is consistent budget 
shortfalls in Ghana.278  An increase in the overall level of 
funding by donor countries might alleviate the shortfall.279  
  
 275 The transition of the U.S. from an agrarian society “rich in resources but 
lacking in capital investment” to an industrial one is credited in part to tariffs, without 
which the transition would have been much slower.  See WEISMAN, supra note 41, at 
14; see also WILLIAM A. LOVETT, ALFRED E. ECKES JR. & RICHARD L. BRINKMAN, U.S. 
TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 45 (2004) (finding the current 
association of free trade with rapid economic growth “incompatible with American 
economic history,” which shows that “[t]he most rapid growth occurred during periods 
of high protectionism”). 
 276 In Ghana, 17% of total revenue derives from non-tax sources.  STATE OF 
THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY, supra note 170, at 26-31.  Of this amount 86% (or just under 
15% of total revenues) derives from grants.  The other 14% derives from receipts from 
various fees charged by the government for particular services, and from amounts 
received in divestiture of state-owned enterprises.  In this respect, Ghana is somewhat 
better off than many of the other LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, which rely heavily on 
foreign aid to subsidize their expenditures.  For example, 53% of Uganda’s budget 
comes from external loans and grants.  See Gumisai Mutume, A New Anti-poverty 
Remedy for Africa?, 16 AFRICA RECOVERY 12 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ 
ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no4/164povty.htm. 
 277 See STATE OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY, supra note 170, at 30, 34.  
 278 Ghana’s 2002 budget provided for an expected budget deficit of 4.4%.  YAW 
OSAFO-MAAFO, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
OF GHANA, 2002 at 11.  Citing “substantial shortfalls in expected foreign inflows,” the 
2003 budget nevertheless projected a smaller deficit of 3.1% of GDP.  YAW OSAFO-
MAAFO, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
GHANA, 2003 at 8, 16, 24, 96.  The 2004 budget, acknowledging that actual receipts 
were significantly lower than projections in 2003 due to shortfalls in grants and other 
non-tax revenues, which resulted in an actual deficit in 2003 of 3.4% rather than the 
anticipated 3.1%, projected a budget surplus for 2004 of 1.67%.  YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, 
THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA, 2004 
at 16, 19, 42. 
 279 For example, if developed countries follow through on their recent pledges 
to relieve existing debt and double aid efforts in Africa.  See, e.g., A First Step on 
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However, a subsequent change of policies by the aid donor 
countries could cripple expectant aid recipients like Ghana, as 
foreign aid typically substitutes for—rather than 
supplements—domestic revenue raising efforts.280  
Multinational companies may be expected to increase 
the government’s ability to collect revenues by creating a larger 
wage base for personal income tax.  Wages in LDCs such as 
Ghana, however, average $1 per day, producing little for the 
government to share.281  If wages are raised through regulatory 
action, many multinationals may disengage to seek low wages 
elsewhere, since the low cost of labor is often a primary reason 
multinationals set up in LDCs.282  Although workers may 
benefit individually from employment created by foreign 
investment, even if wages are only minimally higher than that 
offered by other local employment, they are not necessarily 
placed in a better position with respect to paying taxes.283 
Investment protection or insurance—whether made 
available through private or public institutions—may promote 
foreign investment despite a country’s infrastructural 
deficiencies.  In the U.S., investment protection is provided to 
  
African Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A22 (describing Bush’s pledge to “ease the 
burden of debt in Africa”); Celia W. Dugger, U.S. Challenged to Increase Aid to Africa, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at A10 (describing building consensus for doubling of aid to 
Africa); Paul Blustein, After G-8 Aid Pledges, Doubts on ‘Doing It,’ WASH. POST, July 
10, 2005, at A14 (describing pledges of the G-8 countries to double their aid to Africa, 
but noting that “[t]he amounts actually spent have a history of falling far short of the 
amounts pledged”). 
 280 Kaldor, supra note 267, at 410. 
 281 Nearly 45% of the population of Ghana lives on less than $1 per day.  
United Nations 
Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2005, at 228, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005.  In all of Sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is 
close to 46%.  See Patricia Kowsmann, World Bank Finds Global Poverty Down By Half 
Since 1981, U.N. WIRE, April 23, 2004, available at http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/News_flash2004/23%20Apr%20World%20Bank%20Finds%20Global.htm.  
Globally, it is estimated that about half of the earth’s population lives on under $2 per 
day, a fact that has been central to the most recent efforts of the U.S. to combat poverty 
with new foreign aid strategies aimed at economic growth.  See, e.g., Colin L. Powell, 
Give Our Foreign Aid to Enterprising Nations, NEWSDAY (New York), June 11, 2003, at 
A34 (discussing the role of the Millennium Challenge Account in a new strategy of 
directing foreign aid to “support for sustainable development” in the face of the ongoing 
challenge of widespread global poverty). 
 282 HOOKE, supra note 124, at 18-19. 
 283 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Inviting All Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, 
at A19 (arguing that “the fundamental problem in the poor countries of Africa and Asia 
is not that sweatshops exploit too many workers; it’s that they don’t exploit enough,” as 
illustrated by the example of a young Cambodian woman who averages seventy-five 
cents a day from picking through a garbage dump and for whom “the idea of being 
exploited in a garment factory—working only six days a week, inside instead of in the 
broiling sun, for up to $2 a day—is a dream”). 
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U.S. investors through the United States Export-Import Bank 
(“Ex-Im Bank”), an independent federal government agency 
that “assume[s] credit and country risks the private sector is 
unable or unwilling to accept,” through export credit insurance, 
loan guarantees, and direct loans to U.S. businesses investing 
in foreign countries.284  For example, Ex-Im Bank insurance 
covers the risk of foreign buyers not paying bills owed to U.S. 
investors, the risk that a foreign government might restrict the 
U.S. company from converting foreign currency to U.S. 
currency, and even the risk of loss due to war.285  In effect, this 
kind of investment protection substitutes U.S. infrastructure 
for that existing in LDCs.286   
The Ex-Im Bank has a Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory 
Committee devoted specifically to supporting U.S. investment 
activity in this region.287  With investment protection available 
as a substitute for prohibitive infrastructural shortcomings, 
investment in LDCs like Ghana may not be economically 
prohibitive.  Yet, the persistently low level of foreign 
investment in Ghana and Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
suggests that investment protection is not enough to overcome 
the barriers perceived by potential investors. 
E. Entrenched Investor Perception 
As tax treaties with LDCs may provide little commercial 
benefit to investors when little or no income tax is imposed in 
these countries, it is perhaps not surprising that they are 
correspondingly low on the list of U.S. treaty priorities.288  
  
 284 See Mission of Export-Import Bank of the United States, 
http://www.exim.gov/about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
 285 See, e.g., Multi-Buyer Export Credit Insurance, http://www.exim.gov/ 
products/insurance/multi_buyer.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
 286 The subsidy is not without controversy.  See, e.g., Heather Bennett, House 
OKs Measure to Block Loans to Companies Relocating in Tax Havens, 2004 WTD 139-4 
(reporting that as part of a foreign aid bill, U.S. Export-Import Bank loans would no 
longer be made to corporate entities chartered in one of several listed tax havens 
because, according to Representative Sanders, who offered the bill, “[c]ompanies that 
dodge U.S. taxes should not be rewarded with taxpayer handouts,” but should “go to 
the government” of the applicable tax haven for such privileges). 
 287 See Export-Import Bank of the United States, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Advisory Committee, http://www.exim.gov/about/leadership/africa.htm (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2005). 
 288 See Statement of Barbara Angus, supra note 5, at 10, stating that the 
United States generally does not: 
conclude tax treaties with jurisdictions that do not impose significant income 
taxes, because there is little possibility of the double taxation of income in the 
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Nevertheless, tax treaties continue to be promoted for their 
ability to increase investment between developed and less-
developed countries.  One theory for their promotion is that 
increased investment can be expected due to the signaling 
effects of tax treaties.289  For example, it has been suggested 
that tax treaties may signal a stable investment and business 
climate in which treaty partners express their dedication to 
protecting and fostering foreign investment.290   
Proponents of this argument suggest that in the process 
of negotiating a tax treaty, governments of LDCs may subject 
their operations to increased transparency and accountability, 
thus providing additional benefits to potential investors (as 
well as domestic taxpayers) in the form of assurances regarding 
the proper management of public goods.291  Thus, bilateral tax 
treaties may  
  
cross-border context that tax treaties are designed to address: with such 
jurisdictions, an agreement focused on the exchange of tax information can be 
very valuable in furthering the goal of reducing U.S. tax evasion. 
 289 Mutén, supra note 79, at 5. 
 290 The Secretary of the Treasury proclaimed the importance of signing a tax 
treaty with Honduras in 1956, stating that as the first treaty with any Latin American 
country,  
[t]he agreement may . . . have a value far beyond its immediate impact on the 
economic relations between the United States and Honduras.  It may 
generate among smaller countries an increased awareness of the need to 
create an economic atmosphere that will lend itself to increased private 
American investment and trade. 
Dulles, supra note 5, at 1444.  Similar sentiment has been expressed in the context of 
many treaties, especially those with LDCs, over the years.  See, e.g., STAFF OF S. 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 108TH CONG., TAXATION CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL 
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 4 (S. Exec. Rpt. 108-11, Mar. 18, 2004) (“in 
countries where an unstable political climate may result in rapid and unforeseen 
changes in economic and fiscal policy, a tax treaty can be especially valuable to U.S. 
companies, as the tax treaty may restrain the government from taking actions that 
would adversely impact U.S. firms”); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH 
CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA 61 (Comm. Print 
1999) (“the proposed treaty would provide benefits (as well as certainty) to taxpayers”).  
These concepts are also reflected in commentary.  See, e.g., ANDERSEN & BLESSING, 
supra note 10, at ¶ 1.02[3][b] (“[in the context of LDCs,] tax treaties provide foreign 
investors enhanced certainty about the taxation of the income from their 
investments.”); see also Davies, supra note 216, at 3 (“even a treaty that merely codifies 
the current practice reduces uncertainty for investors by lowering the likelihood that a 
government will unilaterally change its tax policy”). 
 291 See, e.g., U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Significance of Bilateral 
Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SG/2001/L.9 (Apr. 2, 2001) (prepared by Mayer Gabay), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000550.pdf 
(suggesting that the first advantage to a LDC of entering into a bilateral tax treaty is 
the negotiation process itself, because that process creates a degree of transparency, 
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serve largely to “signal that a country is willing to adopt the 
international norms” regarding trade and investment, and hence, 
that the country is a safe place to invest, especially “in light of the 
historical antipathy that many developing and transition countries 
have in the past exhibited to inward investment.”292 
Signaling is a slippery concept because it is difficult to 
measure whether signaling is occurring and, if so, whether and 
to what extent it is impacting investors.  The potential for 
signaling a stable investment climate through tax treaties with 
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hampered by the 
persistence of negative perceptions about this region’s 
investment climate.293  Foreign investors in LDCs often take a 
regional, rather than national, approach to investment, 
attributing the negative aspects of one country to others in the 
vicinity.294  Since few Sub-Saharan African countries have tax 
treaties, and many countries in the region suffer from civil 
unrest and economic failure, Ghana’s ability to demonstrate 
stability and certainty may garner little individual attention 
from foreign investors unfamiliar with its particular 
situation.295 
In addition, the signaling effect is tied to a country’s 
reputation in upholding its international compacts.  Short of 
terminating a treaty, there is no formal enforcement 
mechanism should a country proceed to ignore its treaty 
obligations.296  For example, it is difficult to imagine that a tax 
  
which in turn promotes “greater rationality in decision making[,]” which “can be of 
great economic benefit to the developing country”) 
 292 Stewart, supra note 11, at 148 (citing Richard J. Vann, International 
Aspects of Income Tax, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 726 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 
2000)). 
 293 See UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 1. 
 294 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at iv, (“[L]ittle attempt is often made to 
differentiate between the individual situations of more than 50 countries of the 
continent.”); Laura Hildebrandt, Senegal Attracts Investors, But Slowly, 17 AFRICA 
RECOVERY 2-15 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/ 
vol17no2/172inv3.htm (“[F]oreign investors tend to lump countries together in regions, 
without making much distinction among individual countries,” which might explain 
Senegal’s limited success in attracting foreign investment despite “relatively good 
infrastructure . . . a history of political stability and secular democracy, with decidedly 
pro-market leanings.”).  
 295 See, e.g., Hildebrandt, supra note 294, at 15 (“Senegal’s reputation for 
stability may be offset by conflicts elsewhere in the region, such as Côte d’Ivoire.”); 
Thabo Mbeki: A Man of Two Faces, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 27 
(“[A]ny . . . plan for Africa’s redemption, will work only if functioning states with 
reasonably good leaders (South Africa, Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, Mozambique) can 
be set apart from the awful ones . . . .”). 
 296 In the case of a treaty violation, a taxpayer would request the Competent 
Authority of its home country to negotiate with the Competent Authority in the treaty 
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treaty could independently create a sense of stability in a 
country that would otherwise be unattractive due to historical 
failure to protect property rights. 
Finally, treaty proponents point to the certainty 
achieved in establishing rules consistent with international 
norms so that investors will know what to expect regarding the 
taxation of their investments in foreign countries.  However, 
signaling certainty and stability is achieved more directly 
through agreements designed to provide these specific benefits.  
For example, delivering certainty and stability is the primary 
purpose of investment protection provisions in global and 
regional trade agreements.297  These goals are also 
encompassed in a global network of over 2,100 bilateral 
investment protection treaties (BITs).298  Ghana has seventeen 
such treaties currently in force.299  The U.S. has forty-seven in 
force and relies on these agreements to protect investment in 
source countries.300 
Investment protection provisions and treaties outline 
the applicable legal structure and regulatory framework of the 
signatory countries and provide settlement provisions in the 
  
partner country.  For this reason, investors may desire a tax treaty to be in place so 
that assistance in negotiating disputes with a foreign country could be sought from the 
U.S. Competent Authority.  However, treaties provide little recourse in the event the 
Competent Authorities fail to reach a resolution.  See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 
25.  
 297 See Stephen S. Golub, Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment for OECD Countries 6 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 357, 2003).  
Most of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ghana, have signed multilateral 
agreements dealing with the protection of foreign investment, such as the Convention 
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.  See 
UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
 298 WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 89-91 (stating that BITs signal a country’s 
attitude towards and climate for foreign investment, and that investors “appear to 
regard BITs as part of a good investment framework”).  Worldwide, there are 2,181 
BITs currently in force, encompassing 176 countries.  Id. at 89.  As in the case of tax 
treaties, significantly more BITs would be required to achieve global coverage.  See 
supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 299 These treaties include agreements with Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  See UNCTAD Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Database, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx? 
id=779 (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). 
 300 Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm. on Economic Treaties, 
108th Cong. 9-10 (2004) (statement of Shaun Donnelly, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, State Dep’t) (“BITs have afforded 
important protections to U.S. investors”).  The U.S. currently has four BITs with LDCs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Mozambique, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.  For a list of U.S. BITs currently in force, see UNCTAD Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Database, supra note 299. 
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event of disputes between investors and source-country 
governments.  Common features include guarantees of 
compensation in the event of expropriation, guarantees of free 
transfers of funds and repatriations of capital and profits, and 
dispute settlement provisions.301  The goal of these agreements 
is to promote transparency, stability, and predictability for 
regulatory frameworks in source countries, and therefore to 
reduce obstacles to the flow of foreign investment.302  BITs are 
further bolstered through subsidized loans, loan guarantees, 
and other financial assistance made available to foreign 
investors.303  
Even if the stability and certainty signaled by tax 
treaties could make a source country that has such agreements 
more attractive than one that does not, U.S. investors are 
unlikely to lobby for tax treaties if they do not have a direct 
financial interest at stake, namely, an exposure to taxation 
that could be alleviated by treaty.304   
The foreign investment patterns of U.S. businesses also 
imply that tax treaties may be an insufficient signal to 
investors.305  First, U.S. investors will pursue investments in a 
country with a sufficiently attractive business environment, 
even in the absence of a tax treaty.306  For example, although 
the U.S. has no treaty with Brazil,307 U.S. foreign direct 
investment in Brazil is significant.308  Second, the mere 
  
 301 WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 89. 
 302 Id. at 91. 
 303 See supra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Ex-
Im Bank in subsidizing U.S. investors to LDCs). 
 304 The lobbying efforts of U.S. businesses may not be the most appropriate 
means of establishing a list of priorities for new treaties, however, it is one of the 
primary factors considered by the office of International Tax Counsel in making such 
decisions.  See Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 5, at 10. 
 305 See Mutén, supra note 79, at 4. 
 306 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 87, at 4-5 (arguing that tax treaties “make less 
difference to domestic taxpayers investing abroad,” especially if taxes are low in source 
countries). 
 307 Brazil is one of the South American countries that refuses to negotiate 
with the U.S. due to the tax sparing controversy.  See Laurey, supra note 222, at 491 
n.155 (noting that due to the tax sparing controversy, Mexico was the first Latin 
American nation to sign a tax treaty with the U.S.); Mitchell, supra note 11, at 213; 
Guttentag, supra note 4, at 451-52.  The latest U.S. discussions with Brazil were held 
in 1992.  See Venuti et al., supra note 14. As Brazil continued to insist on tax sparing 
and the U.S. refuses to negotiate with countries that insist on including such a 
provision, no further meetings are planned.  See id. 
 308 As valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ equity in 
and net outstanding loans to Brazilian affiliates), U.S. foreign direct investment in 
Brazil is currently valued at almost $30 billion.  Borga & Yorgason, supra note 101, at 
49.  At 1.7% of total U.S. foreign direct investment, Brazil’s market for U.S. foreign 
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presence of a tax treaty will generally overcome neither an 
otherwise poor business climate, nor one that deteriorates after 
a treaty is in place.  For example, the U.S. entered into a treaty 
with Venezuela in 1999, but the amount of U.S. capital flowing 
to Venezuela subsequently dropped sharply due to “concerns 
over regulations and political instability in the country.”309   
Finally, some investors may not necessarily want a tax 
treaty because such agreements usually include measures that 
prevent tax evasion, as discussed above.310  Thus while tax 
treaties may send positive signals to investors, they may as 
likely send negative signals to the extent they lead the way to 
stronger enforcement of tax laws.  Supporting tax evasion is 
clearly indefensible as a policy for encouraging investment in 
LDCs, but the benefits of such opportunities to existing 
investors, and the cost of eliminating such opportunities, 
cannot be ignored.311  
Nevertheless, easing enforcement and administration of 
the tax laws of potential LDC treaty partners may be an 
alternative reason to continue expanding the U.S. tax treaty 
network.312  For example, the information-exchange provisions 
  
direct investment is not far behind that of some developed countries, including Spain 
(with 2.1% of U.S. foreign direct investment) and Australia (with 2.3%).  Id. at 42. 
 309 UNCTAD, FDI in Brief: Venezuela (2004), 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_ib_ve_en.pdf. 
 310 In the past, tax treaties may have contributed to tax evasion by creating 
opportunities for “treaty shopping” through the use of multi-country tiered structures 
such as the one shut down in Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 TC 925 (1971).  In that 
case, the U.S.-Honduras treaty then in force was used to channel interest payments 
free of tax from the U.S. to the Bahamas.  Id. at 929-31.  The U.S.-Honduras treaty was 
terminated in 1966, before the case was decided but in connection with these kinds of 
structures, deemed to be void of any “economic or business purpose” by the Tax Court.  
Id. at 929, 934.  Treaty shopping has since been curtailed in newer treaties and 
protocols by means of stronger limitation of benefits provisions.  See Arnold & Dibout, 
supra note 252, at 73-74. 
 311 Just as in the cases of deferral and bank secrecy, the private sector can be 
expected to protect tax advantages regardless of whether they comport with a coherent 
tax policy. 
 312 Obtaining cooperation in tax enforcement through information sharing 
provisions is a major factor in the completion of treaties from the perspective of the 
U.S.  For example, the newly-ratified tax treaty with Sri Lanka was originally 
negotiated almost twenty years ago but only entered into force this year.  U.S.-Sri 
Lanka Treaty, supra note 4; Treasury Press Rel. JS-1809, supra note 4.  Ten years of 
the delay were due to Sri Lanka’s reluctance in accepting U.S. requests regarding 
information exchange.  See Letter of Submittal from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Department 
of State, to the President (Aug. 26, 2003), reprinted in Protocol Amending Tax 
Convention with Sri Lanka, U.S-Sri Lanka, Sept. 20, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-9 
(2003).  The fact that, as in the case of Ghana, Sri Lanka’s statutory rates and tax 
incentive regimes indicate that the domestic tax regime is as or more favorable than 
that provided under the treaty, suggests that prevention of double taxation plays a 
much less significant role than prevention of tax evasion. 
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might enable Ghana to extend its current, basically territorial, 
regime to a worldwide regime.313  The benefit of such a regime 
would depend on the amount of savings shifted to the U.S. by 
Ghanaian persons before and after the treaty.  This is 
presumably a relatively tiny amount by global standards,314 but 
it might be significant to the overall revenue picture in Ghana.  
However, Ghana’s limited tax treaty network significantly 
restricts its ability to enlarge its taxing jurisdiction, since 
Ghanaians could simply choose a location other than the U.S. 
for their offshore activities, avoiding Ghanaian tax even under 
a worldwide system.315   
Moreover, as in the case of investment protection, the 
benefits of information exchange are as readily—and more 
broadly—achieved through agreements specifically addressing 
this issue.  Information exchange is comprehensively addressed 
in Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), which are 
generally bilateral, and through multilateral agreements such 
as the OECD TIEA.316  Under U.S. TIEAs, assistance in tax 
enforcement and collection is extended not only to income taxes 
but to other taxes as well, making such agreements potentially 
more effective than tax treaties in fulfilling the goal of 
improved tax administration and enforcement.317   
  
 313 See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 26.  For example, when Venezuela 
entered into a tax treaty with the United States, its tax regime was territorial: 
Venezuela imposed no tax on the foreign income of its residents.  Its tax treaty with the 
U.S. included the typical exchange-of-information provision, which would theoretically 
allow Venezuela to pursue its residents who engaged in activities outside of the 
country, and Venezuela subsequently expanded its jurisdiction to encompass residence-
based taxes.  U.S.-Venezuela Treaty, supra note 4, art. 27. 
 314 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs compiles data regarding direct 
investment in the U.S., but Ghana is included only collectively with the rest of Africa, 
excluding South Africa.  Borga & Yorgason, supra note 101, at 51.  Inbound direct 
investment from this region is valued at $1.8 billion, which represents less than 0.2% 
of that from Europe.  Id. 
 315 Ghana would not generally benefit from the larger U.S. tax treaty network 
since the exchange of information is only limited to that which is relevant to the two 
contracting states.  U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 26. 
 316 The OECD Agreement has been signed by the U.S. and Canada, among 
others.  OECD MODEL, supra note 21, at 2. 
 317 The U.S. entered into tax treaties with many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Caribbean simultaneously by territorial extension with their various 
colonial powers (from 1957-1958) and terminated most of these treaties simultaneously 
three decades later (in 1983-1984).  See supra note 6.  The U.S. subsequently entered 
into TIEAs only with the Caribbean nations.  See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, OECD Report on 
Harmful Tax Competition: Strategic Implications for Caribbean Offshore Jurisdictions, 
17 TAX NOTES INT’L 1507, 1510 (1998).  The U.S. has trade agreements with countries 
in both the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, sends foreign aid to both regions, and 
has expressed a desire to increase investment, trade, and aid to both regions.  See 
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Absent reduction of double taxation, the non-commercial 
benefits of tax treaties appear incapable of independently 
exerting a significant influence on U.S. foreign investment, and 
some of the aspects of tax treaties may tend to discourage such 
investment.  Ultimately, the value of continued expansion of 
the U.S. tax treaty network to LDCs may therefore be 
extremely limited in the context of a global tax climate that 
reflects the circumstances illustrated in this case study.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The investment and aid goals of tax treaties are 
undermined by competing tax regimes, including domestic U.S. 
rules that provide relief of current U.S. tax burdens on foreign 
income earned by multinational companies.  To the extent 
multinationals can escape U.S. taxation simply by investing 
abroad, the U.S. fosters tax competition throughout the world 
as foreign countries compete to attract the U.S. capital fleeing 
taxation at home.  As a result of this international tax 
competition and a corresponding divergence in tax mix between 
developed and less developed countries, much of the tax 
ostensibly relieved under tax treaties no longer exists to a 
significant extent with respect to investment in many LDCs.   
As a result, traditional tax treaties with these countries 
may offer few commercial benefits to investors.  Tax treaties 
may provide non-commercial benefits to partner countries and 
investors by signaling stability or suitability or by providing 
certainty.  However, these incidental benefits are likely 
insufficient to significantly impact investment in many LDCs, 
particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Thus, as this case 
study of Ghana demonstrates, much of the conventional 
wisdom about the impact of tax treaties on the global flow of 
investment does not apply in the context of many of the LDCs 
most in need of realizing the benefits attributed to these 
agreements.   
Tax treaties represent a significant opportunity cost for 
LDCs, diverting attention and resources away from the 
exploration of more direct ways to increase cross-border 
investment.  Thus, every potential tax treaty relationship with 
LDCs should be approached critically.  If a tax treaty cannot be 
expected to provide sufficient benefits to investors, it should 
  
supra notes 2-3.  Yet there is no agreement on tax matters with respect to the LDCs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  See discussion supra Part I. 
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not be pursued simply to include the target country in the 
network of treaty countries in a myopic adherence to 
traditional notions about the international tax and business 
community.  After decades of faithfulness to the promise of tax 
treaties, their inability to deliver in situations involving LDCs 
must be acknowledged.  If the U.S. is truly committed to 
increasing trade and investment to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it must pursue alternative means of achieving these 
goals. 
